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BOSTOCK WAS BOGUS:
TEXTUALISM, PLURALISM, AND TITLE VII
Mitchell N. Berman* & Guha Krishnamurthi**
In Bostock v. Clayton County, one of the blockbuster cases from its 2019
Term, the Supreme Court held that federal antidiscrimination law prohibits
employment discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender
identity. Unsurprisingly, the result won wide acclaim in the mainstream legal
and popular media. Results aside, however, the reaction to Justice Neil
Gorsuch’s majority opinion, which purported to ground the outcome in a
textualist approach to statutory interpretation, was more mixed. The great
majority of commentators, both liberal and conservative, praised Justice
Gorsuch for what they deemed a careful and sophisticated—even “magnificent”
and “exemplary”—application of textualist principles, while a handful of
critics, all conservative, agreed with the dissenters that textualism could not
deliver the outcome that the decision reached.
This Article shows that conservative critics of the majority’s reasoning
were correct—up to a point. Specifically, it argues that Title VII’s ban on
discrimination “because of” an employee’s “sex” does not cover discrimination
because of their sexual orientation as a matter of “plain” or “ordinary”
meaning. Further, it demonstrates that Justice Gorsuch’s effort to establish that
result as a matter of “legal” meaning wholly fails because it depends upon a
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fatally flawed application of the “but-for” test for causation, one that flouts
bedrock principles of counterfactual reasoning. It follows that if a textualist
approach to statutory interpretation is correct or warranted, then Bostock was
wrongly decided. However, if Bostock was rightly decided, then it must follow
that textualism is wrong or misguided. This Article endorses the latter
possibility, explaining that the dominant American approach to statutory
interpretation is neither textualist nor purposivist but pluralist. It concludes
by drawing powerful but previously unnoticed support for pluralism from
Justice Samuel Alito’s principal dissent.

,1752'8&7,21

1
2

140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
Id. at 1737.
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In Bostock v. Clayton County, 1 the Supreme Court held that federal
antidiscrimination law prohibits employment discrimination on
grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. 2 Writing for a
majority that included Chief Justice John Roberts and the four liberals,
Justice Neil Gorsuch reasoned that that’s just what Title VII’s
“meaning” requires. Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and
Brett Kavanaugh dissented in two separate opinions, one calling Justice
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Gorsuch’s reading of the text “preposterous.” 3 Bostock was a landmark
event for lesbian, gay, and transgender people, and a powerful blow
for greater social justice. Many pundits and commentators think it just
as important for what it reveals about statutory interpretation on the
Roberts Court. 4
Most commentators from the legal academy and mainstream
media believe the Court reached the right result. 5 So if Justice
Gorsuch’s textualist approach to statutory interpretation gets you
there, well, that’s one big point for textualism—and for Justice
Gorsuch too. Professor Michael Dorf proclaimed Justice Gorsuch’s
opinion “[m]agnificent” and wondered why it wasn’t unanimous.6
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3 Id. at 1755 (Alito, J., dissenting).
4 See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court, 2019 Term—Comment: Which
Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265, 266 (2020); Katie Eyer, Progressive Textualism and LGBTQ
Rights, SCOTUSBLOG (June 16, 2020: 10:23 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/06
/symposium-progressive-textualism-and-lgbtq-rights/
[https://perma.cc/68CQ-9U2C];
Anita S. Krishnakumar, Three Lessons About Textualism from the Title VII Case, YALE J. REGUL.
NOTICE & COMMENT (June 24, 2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/three-lessons-abouttextualism-from-the-title-vii-case-by-anita-s-krishnakumar/
[https://perma.cc/A6NZDGCE]; Jonathan Skrmetti, The Triumph of Textualism: “Only the Written Word Is the Law,”
SCOTUSBLOG (June 15, 2020, 9:04 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/06
/symposium-the-triumph-of-textualism-only-the-written-word-is-the-law/ [https://perma.cc
/PJA5-KVHB].
5 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Essay, Bostock, LGBT Discrimination, and the
Subtractive Moves, 105 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1, 1 (2020) (deeming Bostock “obviously
correct”); Tim Fitzsimons; Supreme Court Sent ‘Clear Message’ with LGBTQ Ruling, Plaintiff
Gerald Bostock Says, NBC (June 16, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out
/supreme-court-sent-clear-message-lgbtq-ruling-plaintiff-gerald-bostock-n1231190
[https://perma.cc/FP7Q-UB4K] (“When the history books are written, Gerald Bostock’s
name will grace the landmark case that on June 15, 2020, won LGBTQ people nationwide
protection from workplace discrimination.”); Adam Liptak, Civil Rights Law Protects Gay and
Transgender Workers, Supreme Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes
.com/2020/06/15/us/gay-transgender-workers-supreme-court.html
[https://perma.cc
/CRH5-Y6BJ] (“The decision was both symbolic and consequential, and it followed in the
tradition of landmark rulings on discrimination.”); Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court’s
Landmark LGBTQ Rights Decision, Explained In 5 Simple Sentences, VOX (June 15, 2020),
https://www.vox.com/2020/6/15/21291515/supreme-court-bostock-clayton-county-lgbtq
-neil-gorsuch [https://perma.cc/P46K-2X66] (“Bostock v. Clayton County . . . was a test of
Justice Neil Gorsuch’s principles. He passed.”); Michael C. Dorf, Does Justice Gorsuch’s
Magnificent Opinion in the Title VII Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Cases Redeem
Textualism?, DORF ON LAW (June 16, 2020), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2020/06/doesjustice-gorsuchs-magnificent.html [https://perma.cc/CVQ3-MVCF] (“Justice Gorsuch’s
opinion for the Supreme Court in Bostock v. Clayton County marks a historic victory for LGBT
Americans, for civil rights more broadly, and for the rule of law.”).
6 Dorf, supra note 5; see also Michael C. Dorf, SCOTUS LGBT Discrimination Case Will
Test Conservative Commitment to Textualism, VERDICT (May 1, 2019), https://verdict.justia
.com/2019/05/01/scotus-lgbt-discrimination-case-will-test-conservative-commitment-totextualism [https://perma.cc/8K8N-ALJD] (calling the textualist case for the Bostock
plaintiffs “straightforward,” and predicting that, if the Court’s conservatives “keep faith with
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Professor Tara Grove channeled a common reaction when observing,
in a comment on the decision published in the Harvard Law Review’s
Supreme Court issue, that Bostock’s “result may be reason enough to
reexamine some assumptions about textualism.”7 Popular commentators from both sides of the aisle claimed that Bostock showed that
textualism could be applied neutrally, and at times deliver liberal
results. 8
But if Justice Gorsuch’s opinion won plaudits from many
conservatives and liberals alike, at least some conservatives demurred.
Professors Josh Blackman and Randy Barnett declared themselves
“surprised and disappointed” by Justice Gorsuch’s “halfway
textualism,” 9 while Professor Nelson Lund derided the majority
opinion as an “analytically untenable” and “outlandish judicial
performance,” one whose “application of textualist principles is fatally
flawed.” 10 The junior Senator from Missouri, a former Roberts clerk,
denounced Bostock as “represent[ing] the end of the conservative legal
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their textualist commitment, they will rule in favor of the plaintiffs”). Dorf’s own praise for
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion was for its result and craftsmanship, but Dorf further argues that
textualism likely did not play a causal role in any Justice’s decision, that a purposivist
opinion would have been more persuasive, and that the Bostock decision does not ultimately
redeem textualism. Dorf, supra note 5.
7 Grove, supra note 4, at 266.
8 George T. Conway III, Why Scalia Should Have Loved the Supreme Court’s Title VII
Decision, WASH. POST (June 16, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020
/06/16/why-scalia-would-have-loved-supreme-courts-title-vii-decision/ [https://perma.cc
/3C49-QZER]; Cristian Farias, Is Neil Gorsuch the New Anthony Kennedy?, GQ (June 15, 2020),
https://www.gq.com/story/neil-gorsuch-scotus-lgbt-decision
[https://perma.cc/PR5KGE4F]; Millhiser, supra note 5.
9 Josh Blackman & Randy Barnett, Justice Gorsuch’s Halfway Textualism Surprises and
Disappoints in the Title VII Cases, NAT’L REV. (June 26, 2020) (emphasis omitted), https://
www.nationalreview.com/2020/06/justice-gorsuch-title-vii-cases-half-way-textualismsurprises-disappoints/ [https://perma.cc/R7ET-AFXR]
10 Nelson Lund, Unleashed and Unbound: Living Textualism in Bostock v. Clayton
County, 21 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 158, 167 (2020); see also Howard Kurtz, Gorsuch Draws
Personal Attacks for Breaking Ranks on Gay Rights, FOX NEWS (June 17, 2020), https://www
.foxnews.com/media/gorsuch-draws-personal-attacks-for-breaking-ranks-on-gay-rights
[https://perma.cc/DMC8-L9RE]; Jeremy Stahl, Conservative Activists and Pundits Are
Melting Down over Gorsuch’s Embrace of LGBTQ Rights, SLATE (June 15, 2020), https://slate
.com/news-and-politics/2020/06/carrie-severino-meltdown-neil-gorsuch-lgbtq-rights.html
[https://perma.cc/RZA3-ECQ5]; Ed Whelan, A ‘Pirate Ship’ Sailing Under a ‘Textualist Flag,’
NAT’L REV. (June 15, 2020), https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/a-pirate-ship
-sailing-under-a-textualist-flag/ [https://perma.cc/79L4-HMZK]; Steven D. Smith, The
Mindlessness of Bostock, LAW & LIBERTY (July 9, 2020), https://lawliberty.org/bostockmindlessness/ [https://perma.cc/YE9X-88KE].
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movement.” 11 “[I]f textualism and originalism gives [sic] you this
decision,” he charged, then “those phrases don’t mean much at all.” 12
The debate over the textualist bona fides of Bostock is important
and far-reaching. 13 To start, many difficult and significant questions
remain regarding the scope of Title VII itself, in relation not only to
sex discrimination but also to discrimination “because of” race, color,
religion, or national origin. 14 Indeed, commentators are already
debating Bostock’s implications for challenges to affirmative action
university admissions programs under Title VII. 15 Furthermore,
particular statutes and disputes aside, there remains the overarching
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11 Josh Blackman, Senator Hawley: Bostock “Represents the End of the Conservative Legal
Movement,” VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 16, 2020), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/06
/16/senator-hawley-bostock-represents-the-end-of-the-conservative-legal-movement/
[https://perma.cc/HJ3T-23XB].
12 Id. True, the speaker was the insurrectionist Josh Hawley, reasonably provoking
the caution “consider the source.” On the other hand, there is wisdom in the adage about
blind squirrels and nuts.
13 See Lund, supra note 10, at 160–63 (discussing Bostock in terms of its departure from
textualist principles properly construed).
14 See, e.g., Guha Krishnamurthi & Charanya Krishnaswami, Title VII and Caste
Discrimination, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 456 (2021) (arguing that, in light of Bostock, caste
discrimination is cognizable under Title VII as race, religion, and national origin
discrimination). For other questions in employment discrimination law that Bostock might
inform, see, e.g., Nimra H. Azmi, Uncovered: Title VI & Title IX’s Limited Protections for Muslim
Students Who Veil, 43 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 281 (2020); D. Wendy Greene, Splitting Hairs:
The Eleventh Circuit’s Take on Workplace Bans Against Black Women’s Natural Hair in EEOC v.
Catastrophe Management Solutions, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 987 (2017).
15 Jeannie Suk Gersen, Could the Supreme Court’s Landmark L.G.B.T.-Rights Decision Help
Lead to the Dismantling of Affirmative Action?, NEW YORKER (June 27, 2020), https://www
.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/could-the-supreme-courts-landmark-lgbt-rightsdecision-help-lead-to-the-dismantling-of-affirmative-action
[https://perma.cc/ZPH2LLA5]; Cass R. Sunstein, Gorsuch Paves Way for Attack on Affirmative Action, BLOOMBERG
(June 18, 2020) https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-06-17/gorsuch-gayrights-opinion-targets-affirmative-action [https://perma.cc/NP2N-62S2].
In a recent case, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard
College, the plaintiff Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. (SFFA) challenged Harvard’s
admissions policies as violating Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et
seq., and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After a bench trial,
the district court rejected SFFA’s claims and a panel of the First Circuit affirmed. 980 F.3d
157, 163–164, 185 (1st Cir. 2020). In its petition for certiorari, SFFA argued that Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), should be overruled, focusing its challenge on the holding
of Grutter that student body diversity serves a compelling interest. Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 25, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 980
F.3d 157 (No. 20-1199), 2021 WL 797848. SFFA did not argue, however, that Grutter should
be overruled insofar as it held that the Title VI standard tracks the Equal Protection Clause
standard, and that under a textualist reading Harvard’s conduct violates Title VI. We find
this surprising, for this is clearly the overruling that Bostock foreshadows.
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See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
See infra Section II.C.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2018).
John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 434–35
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739.
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(2005).
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need to better understand textualism and its place in the Court’s
general jurisprudence and interpretive methodology.16
We think the textualist critics of the Bostock opinion are largely
right: textualism and originalism do mean something, and they do not
license the results that Justice Gorsuch reached in Bostock regarding
sexual orientation discrimination. (We believe that the Court’s
holding regarding transgender identity was defensible on textualist
premises, and will explain the difference between the cases.)17 But,
unlike these critics, we don’t start from the premise that textualism is
correct. There are good reasons to conclude that the result in Bostock
was right—legally correct, not (only) morally. If those reasons are
persuasive, then so much the worse for textualism.
The Article unfolds over three parts. Part I reviews the facts and
opinions in Bostock. Part II mounts our critique of Justice Gorsuch’s
opinion. That critique has two components. First, we contend that
the dissents were correct that the statutory ban on
“discriminat[ion] . . . because of [an] individual’s . . . sex”18 does not
cover discrimination taken by reason of a person’s sexual orientation
as a matter of ordinary meaning or common parlance. Second, we
argue that the statutory phrase also does not cover discrimination by
reason of sexual orientation when given the “technical” legal meaning
that Justice Gorsuch would assign it, 19 namely one that interprets
“because of” as incorporating but-for causation. 20 Simply put, Justice
Gorsuch reached his conclusion that Bostock’s sex was a but-for cause
of his firing by operationalizing the but-for test in an illicit manner,
one that violates fundamental constraints on counterfactual reasoning.
Our demonstration that the Bostock result was not truly reachable via
Justice Gorsuch’s purportedly textualist route is this Article’s most
important and original contribution. If correct, it renders unavailable
the happy outcome that many readers of Bostock seemed eager to
embrace—that you could have ruled for the Bostock plaintiffs and be a
good textualist too.
Part III briefly explores what follows if our analysis in Part II is
correct. One possibility was embraced by the Bostock dissents and by
other socially conservative commentators: textualism is the correct
theory of statutory interpretation, and Bostock was wrongly decided. We
believe, to the contrary, that the legal result in Bostock was likely correct,
and that the substantial plausibility of its holding testifies to the falsity
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of textualism as a theory of statutory interpretation. In presenting this
argument, we press two points that are of fundamental importance to
debates over contemporary statutory interpretation but are curiously
and routinely overlooked in the academic literature that sets forth
“textualism” and “purposivism” as the main contending theories of, or
approaches to, statutory interpretation. First, the kinds of goals, ends,
or intentions that scholars call “legislative purposes” fall into (at least)
two quite distinct conceptual categories, what we’ll call “legal
intentions” and “policy goals.” Second—and of much greater
importance to this interpretive dispute—whether legislative purposes
be associated with legal intentions or policy goals or anything else, any
classificatory scheme that would oppose purposivism to textualism
misleads by ignoring a fundamental asymmetry in interpretive
approaches: textualists are overwhelmingly monist in their
foundations; non-textualists are not. The more revealing classificatory
scheme would contrast textualism not with purposivism, but with
pluralism. We close by distilling ironic support for a pluralist approach
to statutory interpretation from Justice Alito’s purportedly textualist
Bostock dissent.
I.

BOSTOCK IN BRIEF
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21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2018) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin . . . .”).
22 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979).
23 Id. at 938. Blum cited Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir.
1978), for support, but Smith had held only that discrimination based on being an
“effeminate” male did not violate Title VII. Id. at 326–27.
24 Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999);
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
260 F.3d 257, 259 (3d Cir. 2001); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th
Cir. 1996); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) (per
curiam); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-330 (9th Cir. 1979); Medina
v. Income Support Div., N.M., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Fredette v. BVP Mgmt.
Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1997); cf. Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 42 Side A

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful “for an
employer . . . to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such
individual’s . . . sex.” 21 The first appellate decision to address whether
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was barred by Title
VII was Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., in 1979. 22 The Fifth Circuit dismissed
the contention in a single sentence. 23 Over the next thirty years, the
issue was litigated in eight Circuits and all followed Blum in rejecting
the claim. 24 Strikingly, every panel appeared to find the question easy:
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four expended no more than a sentence on the issue, and not one
elicited a dissent.25
Then, shortly after 2010, four cases—Zarda v. Altitude Express, 26
Bostock v. Clayton County, 27 EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 28
and Hively v. Ivy Tech 29—were filed and would wend through the courts
over the next decade. The first three would become consolidated at
the Supreme Court.
A. The Decisions Below
In Zarda, filed in 2010, plaintiff David Zarda, a skydiving
instructor, alleged that his employer had terminated him for being
gay 30 and thus violated Title VII and New York state law.31 The district
court granted summary judgment against Zarda on the Title VII claim,
on factual grounds that did not feature the fact of his sexual
orientation. 32 On appeal, a panel of the Second Circuit affirmed. 33
Thereafter, a majority of the Second Circuit sitting en banc reversed
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748 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (“transsexual” status). The Sixth Circuit followed suit
thereafter. Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 471 (6th Cir. 2012).
25 Not on this issue. There were dissents on other issues. Wrightson, 99 F.3d 144–45
(Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (agreeing that sexual orientation is not cognizable under Title
VII, but contending that same-sex harassment claims are also not cognizable under Title
VII); DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 333 (Sneed, J., concurring and dissenting) (agreeing that sexual
orientation is not cognizable under Title VII, but contending that a disparate impact theory
should survive motion to dismiss).
26 Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (affirming
district court), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc), aff’d sub
nom. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
27 Bostock v. Clayton County, No. 16-CV-1460, 2017 WL 4456898 (N.D. Ga. July 21,
2017) (adopting magistrate’s report), aff’d mem. sub nom. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 723 F. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam), rev’d sub nom. Bostock v. Clayton
County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
28 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes,
Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Mich. 2016), rev’d, 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), aff’d sub
nom. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
29 Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., No. 14–cv-1791, 2015 WL 926015 (N.D. Ind. 2015),
aff’d, 830 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853
F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
30 We use the term “gay” to mean one intimately attracted to others of one’s same sex
or gender, and regardless of the person’s own sex or gender. That is, a “gay” person may
be a man or a woman (socially) or male or female (biologically). We avoid the term
“homosexual,” except when quoting or otherwise referring to other work, including
judicial opinions.
31 Zarda, 883 F.3d at 108–09.
32 Id. at 109; Zarda v. Altitude Express, 855 F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Bostock v.
Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
33 Zarda, 883 F.3d at 110.
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the district court’s decision, holding that Zarda could raise a claim of
sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII as a form of sex
discrimination. 34 In so doing, the majority appealed to the “sexdependent nature” of sexual orientation discrimination, gender
stereotyping, examining employer motivation, and associational
discrimination. 35 The majority also reasoned that the but-for causation
test showed that sexual orientation discrimination was discrimination
“because of . . . sex.”36 Judges Gerard Lynch and Debra Ann Livingston each dissented, contending principally that the ordinary meaning
of sex discrimination, both in 1964 and in the present day, did not
encompass sexual orientation discrimination.37
Similarly, Bostock, filed in 2013, concerned allegations by plaintiff
Gerald Bostock that he had been terminated for being gay.38 Bostock
was a Child Welfare Services Coordinator for Clayton County, Georgia,
with a record of strong job performance. 39 He was fired shortly after
joining a gay recreational softball league, a job action he alleges was
taken because of his sexual orientation. 40 The district court denied his
claim for sexual orientation discrimination as not cognizable under
Title VII, and also denied his claim for gender stereotyping as factually
unsupported. 41 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.42
Harris Funeral Homes concerned claims by Aimee Stephens that
she had been terminated by her employer for being a transgender
woman. 43 Her employer, a funeral home, “require[d] its public-facing
male employees to wear suits and ties and its public-facing female
employees to wear skirts and business jackets.” 44 Stephens transitioned
and planned to show up at work in the employer-mandated attire
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34 Id. at 131–32.
35 See id. passim.
36 Id. at 115–19 (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2012)).
See infra Sections I.B and II.B for discussion of but-for reasoning and the choice of
comparator.
37 Zarda, 883 F.3d at 137–67 (Lynch, J., dissenting); id. at 167–69 (Livingston, J.,
dissenting).
38 Bostock v. Clayton County, No. 16-CV-1460, 2017 WL 4456898 (N.D. Ga. July 21,
2017) (adopting magistrate’s report from 2016 WL 9753356), aff’d mem. sub nom. Bostock v.
Clayton County Bd. of Comm’rs, 723 F. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam), rev’d sub
nom. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
39 Bostock v. Clayton County, No. 16-CV-001460, 2016 WL 9753356, at *1 (N.D. Ga.
Nov. 3, 2016) (magistrate report).
40 Id. at *1–2.
41 Bostock, 2017 WL 4456898, at *2, *3.
42 Bostock, 723 F. App’x at 964.
43 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes,
Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 566–67 (6th Cir. 2018), aff’d sub nom. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S.
Ct. 1731 (2020).
44 Id. at 568–69.
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appropriate to her gender, but was fired. 45 The district court granted
summary judgment for the employer, reasoning that while Stephens’s
allegations constituted actionable sex stereotyping, the employer had
a defense under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA). 46 The Sixth Circuit reversed, agreeing that Stephens’s allegations constitute actionable sex stereotyping under Title VII but
holding RFRA inapplicable. 47
Finally, in Hively, Kimberly Hively, an adjunct professor at Ivy Tech
Community College, filed a complaint against Ivy Tech alleging she
was passed over for promotion and her contract was nixed on account
of her being gay. 48 Citing Seventh Circuit precedent, the district court
dismissed the complaint. 49 A panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed
based on the same binding precedent, but noted the many
inconsistencies that the precedent produces. 50 The Seventh Circuit
took up the case en banc. 51 In an opinion authored by then-Chief
Judge Diane Wood, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that sexual
orientation discrimination was cognizable as sex discrimination under
Title VII on theories of sex and gender stereotyping, and associational
discrimination. 52 The majority opinion also employed the but-for
causation argument that Justice Gorsuch would later embrace,
comparing Hively, a gay woman, to a straight man. 53 Then-Judge
Diane Sykes dissented, principally observing that judicial updating of
the statute is constitutionally inappropriate and that the plain meaning
of the statute’s ban on sex discrimination does not encompass sexual
orientation discrimination. 54
B. The Supreme Court Resolves

C M
Y K

12/21/2021 11:58:47

45 Id.
46 Id. at 570. Stephens moved to intervene in the appeal, which the Sixth Circuit
granted. Id.
47 Id. at 600.
48 Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
49 Id. at 341.
50 Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 718 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom.
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
51 Hively, 853 F.3d at 343.
52 See id. passim.
53 Id. at 345–46.
54 Id. at 360, 363 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
55 After the adverse decision in the Seventh Circuit, defendant Ivy Tech announced
that it would not petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court and instead defend itself on
the merits of the discrimination charge in the lower courts. Cristian Farias, Losing Employer
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari in three of the cases—
Zarda, Bostock, and Harris Funeral Homes—and consolidated them for
hearing. 55 In a 6–3 decision, the Court held that discrimination on the
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basis of sexual orientation or transgender status constituted
discrimination “because of [an] individual’s . . . sex” and thus violates
Title VII. 56 Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, contended that
this surprising result was required by a textualist reading of the
statute. 57 Textualism is the theory that judges must strictly follow the
“ordinary public meaning” of the statutory text “at the time of [its]
enactment.” 58 In Justice Gorsuch’s summary: “Only the written word
is the law.” 59
The question for a textualist is simple: whether “the ordinary
public meaning” of the phrase “because of such individual’s sex”
encompassed “at the time of its enactment” discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation or gender identity. In answering this question,
the key for Justice Gorsuch resided within the phrase “to discriminate
against any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex.”60 A
person is fired “because of” their sex if their sex is what the law calls a
“but-for” cause of the discrimination. This, he claimed, arose from
“the straightforward application of legal terms with plain and settled
meanings.”61 “[A] but-for test,” Justice Gorsuch further explained,
“directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome
changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause.”62
Justice Gorsuch then applied this analysis to Bostock’s case. As
mentioned, Bostock alleged that his employer fired him because of his
sexual orientation. 63 To determine whether his firing was also
“because of his sex,” Justice Gorsuch would change that one thing—
Bostock’s sex—while keeping everything else—particularly, his
attraction to men—constant. 64 Because the employer didn’t object to
women who were attracted to men, “changing the employee’s sex
would have yielded a different choice by the employer.” 65 Voila: Mr.
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Won’t Ask Supreme Court to Overturn Landmark Gay Rights Ruling, HUFFPOST (Apr. 5, 2017,
5:53
PM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/supreme-court-gay-rights-ivy-tech_n
_58e50f6ae4b0917d34760768 [https://perma.cc/V689-S5AS].
56 Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1736–38 (2020) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e–2(a)(1) (2018)).
57 Id. at 1738.
58 Id. at 1824–25 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 1737 (majority opinion). One of us has previously objected to the facile
conflation of text and law that this passage reflects, see Mitchell N. Berman, The Tragedy of
Justice Scalia, 115 MICH. L. REV. 783, 786–88 (2017), but we put that complaint aside.
60 Bostock, 140 S. Ct at 1738, 1753 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2018)).
61 Id. at 1743.
62 Id. at 1739.
63 Id. at 1737–38.
64 Id. at 1739, 1741–42.
65 Id. at 1741.
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Id. at 1754–55 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1756.
Id.
Id. at 1755.
See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF STATE (1989);
CHARLOTTE WITT, THE METAPHYSICS OF GENDER (2011); Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating
Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995); Anne Fausto-Sterling, Gender/Sex, Sexual Orientation,
and Identity Are in the Body: How Did They Get There?, 56 J. SEX RSCH. 529 (2019) (providing
an extensive review of the scholarship).
We use “sex” here as understood by the courts to encompass the notion of
biological sex, as well as the concept of gender. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202
(9th Cir. 2000).
71 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1761 (Alito, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 1758–59.
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Bostock was fired “because of” his sex, not only because of his sexual
orientation.
Justice Alito’s dissent, also embracing textualism, would have
determined that the ordinary public meaning of Title VII did not
encompass discrimination on account of sexual orientation. 66 Justice
Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, first claimed common parlance on his
side. If your friend is fired because she’s a woman, the natural thing
to say is that she was fired because of her sex. 67 But it would be odd to
describe somebody who’s been fired because she’s gay or transgender
as having been discriminated against “because of their sex.” 68 “If every
single living American had been surveyed in 1964,” he further argued,
“it would have been hard to find any who thought that discrimination
because of sex meant discrimination because of sexual orientation—
not to mention gender identity, a concept that was essentially unknown
at the time.” 69
Obviously, sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity are deeply
intertwined concepts. Advocates and social scientists have helped
make their complex interrelationships clearer. 70 But, according to
Justice Alito, that’s not the issue for a textualist. “Title VII prohibits
discrimination because of sex itself,” Justice Alito insisted, “not
everything that is related to, based on, or defined with reference to,
‘sex.’” 71 To highlight his point, Justice Alito asks the reader to imagine
an employer who acts according to a blanket ban on the employment
of gay people, and therefore fires or refuses to hire a person whom the
employer knows (or believes) to be gay or lesbian, but without any
inkling of that person’s sex. 72 If it’s hard to see how that could be, you
might imagine that the employer requires job applicants to complete
an intake form that asks for the applicant’s surname, first initial, and
sexual orientation, but not the applicant’s sex or gender. All persons
who check “homosexual” (or “bisexual”) are rejected; all who check
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“heterosexual” are hired, or pass through to the next stage. (As Justice
Alito observes, this was essentially U.S. military policy for years.)73 If
the employer’s blanket policy were “no women” instead of “no gay
people,” this would be a textbook case of forbidden discrimination
“because of” the claimant’s sex. Abstracting from the particular facts
presented in any of the consolidated cases, Bostock holds broadly that
this flat and “even-handed” policy against the employment of gay
people is also forbidden discrimination “because of” the sex of any
adversely affected actual or would-be employee.
Justice Alito declared this judgment “preposterous” and derided
the majority’s attempt to “pass off its decision as the inevitable product
of” Justice Scalia’s textualism as a ruse.74 “The Court’s opinion is like
a pirate ship,” he charged. “It sails under a textualist flag, but what it
actually represents is a theory of statutory interpretation that Justice
Scalia excoriated—the theory that courts should ‘update’ old statutes
so that they better reflect the current values of society.” 75 Justice
Kavanaugh’s dissent was more polite but to similar effect, deeming the
majority’s insistence “that it is not rewriting or updating” the statute
“tough to accept.” 76
II.

TORTURED TEXTUALISM
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Id.
Id. at 1755.
Id. at 1755–56.
Id. at 1835 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1738 (majority opinion).
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2018)).
Id. at 1739 (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 350 (2013)).
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Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion starts with a standard textualist
premise: “This Court normally interprets a statute in accord with the
ordinary public meaning of its terms at the time of its enactment.” 77
The Court’s task, then, was to interpret the meaning of “because of
such individual’s . . . sex.” 78 After assuming that “the term ‘sex’ in
1964 referred to ‘status as either male or female [as] determined by
reproductive biology,’” Justice Gorsuch explained that “the ordinary
meaning of ‘because of’ is ‘by reason of’ or ‘on account of.’” 79 So far,
so good (for a textualist).
Unfortunately, Justice Gorsuch’s
performance was mostly downhill from there. Section II.A elaborates
on the commonsensical view that the phrase “discrimination because
of an individual’s sex” does not cover discrimination on account of an
individual’s sexual orientation as a matter of ordinary meaning.
Section II.B—the centerpiece of this Article—argues that but-for
reasoning does not generate a different conclusion. Section II.C turns
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from sexual orientation to gender identity, explaining why the
ordinary meaning of the statutory text does bar employment
discrimination against transgender people even though it does not bar
employment discrimination against gay people.
A. Ordinary Meaning
As textualists repeatedly insist, textualism is not “literalism,”80
where literalism is roughly “dictionary meaning”: the meaning that
could be assigned an utterance by piecing together word meanings
gleaned from a contemporary dictionary according to rules of syntax.
Instead, textualism directs judges to search for, as Gorsuch aptly put it,
“the ordinary public meaning” of a statutory utterance at the time of
enactment. 81 And ordinary public meaning is not just any meaning
that the words in isolation could carry, but rather what a hypothetical
ordinary and reasonable member of the public, attuned to the relevant
context, would understand the statute to communicate or would be
warranted in taking it to cover. 82 Original public meaning—what
textualists claim to be seeking—is thus close kin to “common
parlance.” How people use words and phrases, and how they
understand the use made by others, informs how they will understand
the use of words and phrases in a statutory text. 83 In philosophical
terms, textualists seek pragmatic content, not bare semantic content. 84
This Section examines the ordinary meaning of the statute in four
steps. Subsection II.A.1 introduces dictionary definitions and standard
hypotheticals to bolster the widespread academic and judicial
judgment that the ordinary meaning of the statute disfavored the gay
plaintiffs. Subsection II.A.2 then considers the suggestion that such
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80 This is the central thesis of Kavanaugh’s dissent—that the majority wrongly
privileged “literal” over “ordinary” meaning. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1823–28 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
81 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738 (majority opinion); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 33 (2012) (explaining that
textualists “determin[e] the application of a governing text to given facts on the basis of
how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the text
at the time it was issued”).
82 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1750; id. at 1755 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“And in any event,
our duty is to interpret statutory terms to ‘mean what they conveyed to reasonable people
at the time they were written.’” (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 81, at 16)); Lawrence B.
Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 498 (2013)
(similar).
83 Matters differ a little for specialized legal language, where meaning is set by
understandings of specialists not laypeople. But “because of an individual’s sex” is an
ordinary locution.
84 Mark Greenberg, Legal Interpretation and Natural Law, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 109,
113–14 (2020).

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 45 Side B



43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 46 Side A

12/21/2021 11:58:47

1'/B%(50$1B(7B$/BB'2&; '2127'(/(7( 

2021]

BOSTOCK WAS BOGUS

30

81

intuitive judgments are unreliable for failing to distinguish original
statutory meaning from original expectations regarding the statute’s
applications. It explains why that distinction, albeit of general
importance, finds no foothold here. Subsection II.A.3 derives further
support for the tentative conclusion that emerges from the first two
subsections in the paucity of textualist arguments in briefs supporting
the employees filed at the Supreme Court. In doing so, it also
addresses other arguments in the briefs, including those concerning
sex-stereotyping. Lastly, because Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion
offers so little argument for its supposedly textualist conclusion apart
from the but-for analysis that we criticize in depth in Section II.B.,
subsection II.A.4 jumps straight to the decision’s reception. Here we
critically engage Andrew Koppelman’s textualist defense of the
decision 85 and the eye-opening work of “empirical textualists” that
purports to show that the linguistic intuitions that we present with
some confidence in subsection II.A.1 are not shared by the average
speaker of American English.
1. A First Pass
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85 Koppelman had powerfully argued for a broader, pluralist grounding of gay rights
in previous work. See, e.g., ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 53–71 (2002). Here we are tackling his textualist defense
of Bostock.
86 See, e.g., Sex, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/sex [https://perma.cc/CPS8-E3X3] (providing the definition “the state of being male or
female”); Sex, CAMBRIDGE ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us
/dictionary/english/sex [https://perma.cc/2BTF-UCU9] (providing “the state of being
either male or female”). We put aside whether this definition requires emendation to
accommodate the state of being intersex.
87 Although we are sympathetic to this parsing of the phrase, we are also tempted by
some variant of an alternative offered us by Ben Eidelson. In published writing, Eidelson
has proposed an interpretation of these locutions pursuant to which action by A is “because
of B’s X” if how A “regards [B] [X]-wise” partly explains A’s action. See BENJAMIN EIDELSON,
DISCRIMINATION AND DISRESPECT 16–24 (2015). Put another way, A does Y because of B’s
X whenever A acts on account of any value or quality A assigns B’s X, even when that value
or quality is not a standard value that X is. For example, A fires B because of B’s age if A
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What should we expect native English speakers to understand the
phrase “A did Y because of B’s sex” to mean or encompass? “Sex” has
very many meanings; it is a quintessentially polysemous word. The
primary definition of “sex,” when used as a characteristic of an
individual, is status as either male or female.86 This is just what the
employers in these cases put forth, and what all the Justices accepted.
Accordingly, we might anticipate that the locution “A did Y because of
B’s sex” means A did Y “on account of” B’s being male or on account
of B’s being female. 87 Because B’s being male or B’s being female is
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not the same as B’s being gay or being straight or being bisexual, A’s
doing Y on account of any of these latter three possible properties of
B is not A’s doing Y “because of B’s sex.”
We believe that is what reflection on our speech practices suggests:
in ordinary speech, an employer who discriminates against actual or
would-be employees, both male and female, “by reason of” or “on
account of” their sexual orientation would not be said or understood
to discriminate “by reason of” or “on account of” those individuals’
sex. Judge Sykes put the point concisely in her Hively dissent:
“discrimination ‘because of sex’ is not reasonably understood to
include discrimination based on sexual orientation, a different
immutable characteristic. Classifying people by sexual orientation is
different than classifying them by sex. The two traits are categorically
distinct and widely recognized as such.” 88 Whether or not she was right
on the legal question of whether Title VII prohibits discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation, her analysis of the statutory language’s
ordinary meaning fully comports with our linguistic intuitions.
This is not a partisan or ideologically freighted reading of the
statute. Professor Cass Sunstein elaborates:
[I]magine if an English speaker, now or in 1964, says the following: “I am
opposed to discrimination because of sex. I am also opposed to
discrimination because of sexual orientation.” Does the speaker not
understand the English language? Is she being redundant? (The answer
to both questions is “no.”) Or suppose that an English speaker, now or in
1964, says the following: “I am opposed to discrimination because of sex.
But I am not opposed to discrimination because of sexual orientation.” Is
the speaker contradicting himself? Is he making some sort of logical error?
Does he not understand the language? (The answer to all three questions
is “no.”) 89
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fires B on account of B’s age having the value “42” or the value “older than A”; A fires B
because of B’s sex if A fires B on account of B’s sex having the value “female” or the value
“the same as the standard value of the sex B seeks in their intimate partners.” Eidelson
develops this idea further in a forthcoming publication, Dimensional Disparate Treatment,
that seeks to make this case by drawing on the philosophical distinction between
“determinates” and “determinables” (e.g., red is a determinate of the determinable colored).
Benjamin Eidelson, Dimensional Disparate Treatment, 95 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at 13–14), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3915787.
Eidelson’s proposal is novel and subtle. Space constraints and publishing deadlines prevent
us from addressing it here, but we look forward to doing so on another occasion.
88 Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 363 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(Sykes, J., dissenting).
89 Cass R. Sunstein, Textualism and the Duck-Rabbit Illusion, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE
463, 475 (2020).
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Or suppose the local lesbian motorcycle club advertises for a
mechanic. Straight Stan applies for the gig but isn’t hired. Several
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friends, A, B, and C, are discussing the incident.
conversation:

83

Here’s their

A:

“I heard they didn’t hire Stan because of his sex.”

B:

“I heard they didn’t hire Stan because of his sexual orientation.”

C: “I heard they didn’t hire Stan because of his personality.”
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90 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2018). We are relying heavily here on dictionary
definitions along with our intuitions—and those of other commentators with diverse
ideological commitments—about how hypothetical English speakers would use language
and would understand the use made by others. This is not the only way, and not always the
best, to ascertain the ordinary meaning that textualists seek. Recently, several scholars have
advocated the use of survey instruments to supplant or supplement our preferred sources.
We engage them in subsection II.A.4.
91 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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It seems to us that A, B, and C are disagreeing. We think, further,
that if D overheard the conversation, D would understand that A and
B disagree with each other, and not only with C.
Thought experiments like these bolster the idea that neither in
1964 nor today does employment discrimination against an individual
because they’re gay count as employment discrimination “because of
[that] individual’s . . . sex” as a matter of ordinary public meaning of
the statutory text. 90
One clarification. To say that speakers would rarely use the
locution “A did X because of B’s sex” to refer to action undertaken by
A by reason of B’s sexual orientation, and that listeners would rarely
understand use of that locution to bear that meaning or extension, is
not to deny that there are some contexts in which a speaker might refer
to discrimination because of an individual’s sexual orientation as
“discrimination because of their sex” or that an ordinary listener
would understand that utterance to have that meaning. This follows
from the fact that textualists seek pragmatically enriched content not
bare semantic content. 91
Here’s an example: suppose that Employer, with a strict policy
against employing gay people, knows employee Alex only by email.
Employer knows that Alex is dating Employer’s neighbor, Blake.
When Employer later meets Alex, Employer is surprised to discover
that Alex has the same sex (or gender) as Blake. In consequence,
Employer fires Alex. If Alex charges Employer with firing them
“because of their sex,” the most natural and informative response
would be: “No, I’m firing you because of your sexual orientation.” But
if that’s the most probable and informative answer, it’s not the only
one. An affirmative response to Alex wouldn’t be inapt for it’s the
discovery of Alex’s sex, given what Employer already knows, that drives
Employer’s belief about Alex’s sexual orientation. In this context, it
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might seem a bit off for Employer to flatly deny to Alex that they’re
being fired “because of their sex.” 92
But this is an unusual context, the proverbial exception that
proves the rule. To see this, alter the hypo slightly. Suppose that
Employer has personal familiarity with their employee, Alex, knowing
Alex’s gender and that Alex is dating somebody named Blake.
Naturalizing heterosexuality, Employer assumes that Blake has a
different gender (and sex) than Alex. When Employer meets Blake
and discovers its mistake, Employer fires Alex. In this case, as in the
first, Employer is firing Alex because of their sexual orientation.
However, in this case, unlike the first, if Alex asks, “are you firing me
because of my sex?,” a negative response would be unequivocal. As in
the types of case canvassed above, it would be entirely unnatural to say
that Employer fired Alex because of Alex’s sex. 93 And for textualists,
as Justice Scalia has insisted, the statutory text “‘is to be expounded in
its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes
some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it.’”94


12/21/2021 11:58:47

C M
Y K

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 47 Side B

92 See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1745 (2020) (“In conversation, a
speaker is likely to focus on what seems most relevant or informative to the listener.”).
93 Gorsuch invites us to imagine a case like this, but draws a different lesson:
Imagine an employer who has a policy of firing any employee known to be
homosexual. The employer hosts an office holiday party and invites employees
to bring their spouses. A model employee arrives and introduces a manager to
Susan, the employee’s wife. Will that employee be fired? If the policy works as
the employer intends, the answer depends entirely on whether the model
employee is a man or a woman. To be sure, that employer’s ultimate goal might
be to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. But to achieve that purpose
the employer must, along the way, intentionally treat an employee worse based in
part on that individual’s sex.
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1742.
This is not well reasoned. The question, for a textualist, is not whether the
employer “intentionally treat[ed the] employee worse based in part on that individual’s
sex.” Id. That formulation wrongly conflates questions about intention with questions
about motivation. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Intention, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1147,
1152 (2008). The questions are whether a speaker would describe this type of case as
employment action “because of the employee’s sex,” and whether a listener who heard the
event described this way would correctly understand what happened. The answers to these
questions are “no.” Suppose that there are two model employees, Sally and Ted, and that
each introduces their spouse to a manager. Their spouses, respectively, are Susan and Tom.
If Sally and Ted are both fired and Sally complains that she was fired “because of her sex,”
or that both she and Ted were fired because of their sex, the natural response (from Ted,
the Employer, or an onlooker) is “no, you were fired because of your sexual orientation.”
94 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 81, at 69 (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 451 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833)).
We now encounter a deep problem for textualism. What a speaker is likely to mean when
using a particular locution, and therefore what a reasonable listener would understand the
speaker to mean (and would be warranted in understanding the speaker to mean), is
context sensitive. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 19, at 420 (making this point). But part of
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the context for any statutory text includes that it is legislation and not, say, conversation or
reporting. It is far from clear how to draw sound inferences about the ordinary meaning
of a locution as used in a statute from what the same locution is used or understood to
communicate in other contexts. Some scholars have argued that this problem is fatal to
textualism. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 84, at 118–19 (2020). While that might be so,
because our task here is not to show that textualism is incoherent or untenable, but only
that it does not deliver the conclusion that Title VII prohibits employers from
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, we assume (only arguendo) that the
challenge can be met. In the meantime, it warrants emphasis just how far textualists still
have to travel in providing an adequate account of the “context” that shapes textualist
interpretation. See, e.g., Grove, supra note 4, at 280, 295; James A. Macleod, Finding Original
Public Meaning, 56 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 47), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3729005; see also infra Section II.B.
95 See Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO.
L.J. 569 (1998).
96 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1750.
97 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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If what we’ve said so far is right, it is nearly all a textualist needs:
the legal meaning of the statutory utterance is determined by what
reasonable ordinary people would take it to mean; and reasonable
ordinary people would not take discrimination on account of a
person’s sexual orientation to token or instantiate discrimination
“because of that individual’s sex.” We say nearly all to accommodate
the one familiar situation in which (actual or supposed) facts about the
circumstances in which ordinary speakers would or would not apply a
given locution do not determine the locution’s ordinary meaning:
when speakers would mistakenly apply or withhold a term because of
erroneous beliefs about aspects of the world that the locution’s
meaning makes relevant. 95 A familiar example from constitutional law:
if the original public meaning of the Equal Protection Clause had
been, roughly, that states must treat all persons with equal regard and
respect, and if people believed that state-enforced racial segregation in
schooling complied with that directive, then a textualist court should
recognize that the original application expectations departed from the
original meaning and privilege the latter over the former.
Justice Gorsuch contends that that’s what’s going on here: the
employers and dissents are appealing not to the original public
meaning of the text, but rather to the original public expectations
regarding the set of events to which the meaning would apply. And
this, Justice Gorsuch adds, “is exactly the sort of reasoning this Court
has long rejected,”96 offering Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc., 97 to illustrate. In Oncale, the Court held that the statute covered
male-on-male sexual harassment despite the fact that this “was
assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it
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enacted Title VII.” 98 According to Justice Gorsuch, “[u]nder the
employer’s logic, it would seem this was a mistake.”99
Justice Gorsuch is pressing a false analogy, and both dissents are
right to call him on it. 100 Far from maintaining that Title VII “applies
only to the ‘principal evils’ and not lesser evils that fall within the plain
scope of its terms,” the employers and dissents vigorously contended
precisely what Justice Gorsuch says they didn’t—namely that the
statutory language does bear a different meaning than the plaintiffs
allege. 101 Here, Justice Alito explains, “the interpretation that the
Court adopts does not fall within the ordinary meaning of the statutory
text as it would have been understood in 1964.” 102 In contrast, “[t]o
decide for the defendants in Oncale, it would have been necessary to
carve out an exception to the statutory text.” 103 That’s because the
plaintiff alleged that the harassment occurred because of his sex
(male), and to find that this was not actionable because the alleged
perpetrators were also male would add an extratextual requirement
and thus contradict the text’s ordinary meaning.104
3. Litigation
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98 Id. at 79.
99 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1752.
100 Id. at 1773–74 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Oncale is nothing like these cases . . . .”); id.
at 1834 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority opinion makes a fundamental mistake
by confusing ordinary meaning with subjective intentions.”).
101 Id. at 1774 (Alito, J., dissenting).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
105 Brief for Petitioner, Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (No. 171618), 2019 WL 2763119; Opening Brief for Respondents, Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (No. 171623), 2019 WL 2745391 (Zarda’s brief).
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We find it massively revealing that the plaintiffs in these cases did
not seriously claim statutory ordinary meaning on their side. In their
Supreme Court briefs, Bostock and Zarda advanced many of the
arguments found in the lower court opinions—arguments sounding in
sex stereotyping, associational discrimination, and but-for causation—
but did not even assert that the ordinary meaning of the statutory text
covered discrimination because of an individual’s sexual
orientation. 105
Indeed, out of the over sixty-five amici curiae briefs filed, only
three—the brief of Professors William Eskridge and Andrew
Koppelman, the historians’ brief, and the corpus-linguistics scholars’
brief—squarely maintain that the ordinary meaning of the statutory
phrase at enactment was broad enough to ban discrimination because
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of sexual orientation. 106 In all three, however, the evidence is
extremely meager, consisting essentially of tertiary definitions of “sex”
in contemporaneous dictionaries that supplement the universal
primary definition—the two biological divisions of organisms into
either male or female—with references to an organism’s “behavior.” 107
For example, Eskridge and Koppelman note that one dictionary’s
definition of sex was “the whole sphere of behavior related even
indirectly to the sexual functions and embracing all affectionate and
pleasure-seeking conduct.” 108
We’re not sure that these alternate definitions reveal very much,
for everyone understands that “sex” refers to the property of being
male or female and also refers to conduct. When somebody bemoans
(or boasts?) that they “haven’t had sex in months,” they mean that they
haven’t engaged in sexual intercourse or related intimate behaviors,
not that they’ve lacked the property of being either male or female.
The problem for these amici is that there is a long way to go from
acontextual word definitions to a sound conclusion about the ordinary
meaning of a concrete utterance that includes the word. And all three
briefs stop short of contending that the ordinary or common
understanding of the full statutory phrase “to discriminate against any
individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex”109 would have
extended to bar discrimination against any individual because such
individual engaged in “behavior related even indirectly to sexual
functions.” That’s a good thing because if that were the statute’s
ordinary meaning, it would prohibit discharge of a teacher for having
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106 Brief of William N. Eskridge and Andrew M. Koppelman as Amici Curiae in Support
of Employees at 15–24, Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (Nos. 17-1618, 17-1623, 18-107), 2019
WL 2915046 [hereinafter Brief of Eskridge and Koppelman]; Brief of Historians as Amici
Curiae in Support of Employees at 5–11, Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (Nos. 17-1618, 171623, 18-107), 2019 WL 2915044 [hereinafter Historians’ Brief]; Brief for Amici Curiae
Corpus-Linguistics Scholars Professors Brian Slocum, Stefan Th. Gries, and Lawrence Solan
at 24–26, Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (Nos. 17-1618, 17-1623, 18-107), 2019 WL 3003466
[hereinafter Corpus-Linguistics Scholars’ Brief].
Other briefs make claims that the text and the meaning of the statute
unambiguously prohibit sexual orientation discrimination, but their arguments are not
based on the ordinary meaning of the statutory text; instead, those briefs appeal to other
arguments, such as the but-for analysis and the analogy to anti-miscegenation laws.
107 Brief of Eskridge and Koppelman, supra note 106, at 15–24 (quoting Sex, WEBSTER’S
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d unabridged ed. 1961));
Historians’ Brief, supra note 106, at 5–11 (quoting Sex, RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (unabridged ed. 1966)); Corpus-Linguistics Scholars’ Brief, supra note
106, at 24–26.
108 Brief of Eskridge and Koppelman, supra note 106, at 20–21 (quoting Sex, WEBSTER’S
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d unabridged ed. 1961)).
109 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2018).
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110 Brief of Philosophy Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of the Employees, Bostock,
140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (Nos. 17-1618, 17-1623, 18-107), 2019 WL 2915039 [hereinafter
Philosophers’ Brief].
111 We do have some quibbles though. For instance, the first sentence of the brief’s
argument summary declares that “[t]he concept of ‘sex’ is inextricably tied to the categories
of same-sex attraction and gender nonconformity.” Philosophers’ Brief, supra note 110, at
1. We doubt that the concept of sex is inextricably tied to these other categories even while
the converse is undoubtedly true.
112 Guha Krishnamurthi & Peter Salib, Bostock and Conceptual Causation, YALE J.
REGUL. NOTICE & COMMENT (2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/bostock-andconceptual-causation-by-guha-krishnamurthi-peter-salib/
[https://perma.cc/9QVFETD9]. Gorsuch flirts with this view. And Koppelman also makes this argument.
Koppelman, supra note 5, at 1.
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sexual relations with a student or of a sales associate for engaging in
sexual intercourse on the store floor during business hours.
Having now mentioned the historians’ brief, we add a few words
about its counterpart, the philosophers’ brief, 110 not out of any
commitment to neutrality among the humanities, but because many
workshop attendees have pressed objections to us that reference that
brief or might as well have.
The brief’s central project is to reveal the many and deep ways
that the concepts of sexual orientation and gender identity appeal to
and depend upon the concept of sex. By and large, we believe that the
brief’s conceptual claims are true and persuasively defended. 111 The
present question is whether the tight conceptual relationship between
sexual orientation and sex that the brief illuminates establishes what
matters to a textualist: that employment discrimination against
somebody because they’re gay counts as discrimination “because of
such individual’s sex” as a matter of the ordinary meaning of the
statutory text at time of enactment.
One possible route to an affirmative answer travels via a premise
that one of us has elsewhere dubbed “[c]onceptual [c]ausation”: “If a
putative non-protected basis for discrimination conceptually depends
on the protected characteristics of the plaintiff, then the basis for
discrimination is ‘because of’ the relevant protected category” as a
matter of ordinary language. 112 But conceptual causation is not a
general truth. Suppose A shoots B, a police officer, out of anti-police
animus. In this case, competent English speakers would agree that “A
shot B because B is a police officer.” Plausibly if roughly, a police
officer is a person whose job is to enforce the law, including by
investigating crimes and making arrests. But even if the concept of
police officer depends upon and incorporates the concept of a person,
competent English speakers would firmly deny that “A shot B because
B is a person.”
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113 We bracket Eidelson’s work in progress. See supra note 87.
114 At least two different ideas are captured by the phrase “sex or gender stereotyping.”
One involves statistical generalizations. Take a moving company that declines to hire Betty,
a woman, because of a stereotyped belief that men are physically strong and women aren’t.
We think it uncontroversial that the employer discriminates against Betty “because of her
sex,” for the statute does not prohibit only animus-based discrimination. A second idea
involves a shift from statistical generalizations to normative expectations. Imagine now that
the moving company is persuaded that Betty is plenty strong. They don’t hire her not
because they think she can’t do the work but because they believe she ought not to, that
physical labor is appropriate work only for men. In this latter sense of the term, a practice
of sex (or gender) stereotyping is a practice of requiring conformity to sex (or gender)
norms. That’s the sense we and our interlocutors have presently in mind.
115 See also infra subsection II.B.3 (discussing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.).
116 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
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In saying that conceptual causation is not categorically true, we do
not rule out that a more nuanced thesis in the neighborhood might
be. But the philosophers’ brief does not advance a more plausible
refinement, and none occurs to us.113 Instead, many philosophically
minded colleagues take the conceptual connection between sex and
sexual orientation in a slightly different direction, aiming to establish
that employment discrimination against gay people is a form of sex or
gender stereotyping 114 and that sex or gender stereotyping counts as
discrimination because of an individual’s sex.
To understand the argument and its flaws, reflect first on a
different case. Suppose that Employer fires Fran, a straight ciswoman,
for wearing her hair short. In Employer’s view, women should wear
their hair long. This is surely true: “Fran was fired on account of her
failure to conform to gender norms.” Is it also true that “Fran was fired
because of her sex”?
Distinguish two versions. In Version 1, Employer imposes this
gender norm on female but not male employees. Were Fran a cisman,
he could wear his hair short or long or not at all. We think that Version
1 is rightly described as discrimination “because of Fran’s sex” because
it is Fran’s being a woman that subjects her to burdensome terms of
employment—that she must conform to gender norms regarding hair
length—that male employees do not face. 115 Version 2 is the more
relevant and challenging. Here Employer announces and adheres to
a sex-neutral policy according to which all employees must abide by
gender-appropriate hair-length norms: short for men, long for women.
Now was Fran fired “because of her sex”? The seminal case of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins holds that, as a legal matter, she was.116 Textualist
defenders of the Bostock result say that the same conclusion follows if
Fran was fired not because of her hair length but because she is
attracted to women, even pursuant to an “evenhanded” sex-neutral
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117 Gottlob Frege, On Sense and Reference, 100 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE UND
PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK 25 (1892), reprinted in TRANSLATIONS FROM THE PHILOSOPHICAL
WRITINGS OF GOTTLOB FREGE 56 (Peter Geach & Max Black eds., 2d ed. 1960).
118 Philosophers’ Brief, supra note 110, at 3, 12.
119 Id. at 2.
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policy that requires heterosexuality of male and female employees
alike.
Not so fast. First, to accept that Price Waterhouse was rightly
decided is not to grant that it reflects the ordinary meaning of the
statutory text at enactment; we can’t simply assume that it was a sound
decision on textualist premises. To anticipate a point we’ll hammer at
shortly, the firing of Fran could fall within the ordinary meaning of
“sex discrimination,” but not count as discrimination “because of
Fran’s sex.” Second, even if employment discrimination against
somebody because of their nonconformity with sex or gender norms
regarding hair length (or attire or some other aspect of their behavior)
counts as discrimination “because of such individual’s sex” as a matter
of ordinary meaning, it remains a separate question whether
discrimination because the individual is gay does too. Some colleagues
deny that this is a separate question, insisting that to discriminate
against people because they’re gay “just is” to discriminate against
them because of their failure to abide by sex- or gender-based norms
of sexual attraction: women for men, men for women. But the
reduction of anti-gay discrimination to the enforcement of sex- or
gender-based behavioral norms is too facile for it might not represent
that way to the employer, and the locution “A does X because of Y”
tracks, at least in part, the actor’s view of Y, not only the philosophically
informed view of Y. An analogy that signatories of the philosophers’
brief might appreciate: that anti-gay discrimination in employment is
a form of sex- or gender-stereotyping does not entail that an employer
who fires an employee “because they’re gay” would be understood to
fire that employee “because they fail to conform to sex- or genderbased norms of conduct” as a matter of ordinary meaning, any more
than that Mark Twain “just is” Samuel Clemens entails that someone
who believes that Mark Twain wrote Huckleberry Finn thereby believes
that Samuel Clemens wrote Huckleberry Finn. 117
Happily, the philosophers’ brief does not truly maintain
otherwise. Its central argument is moral, not textual. Although it
advances claims about “[t]he most logical and reasonable” reading of
the statute, 118 it is a reflection on “[t]he philosophical underpinnings
of antidiscrimination laws” 119—not common usage—that underwrites
those judgments.
Because “what unifies practices deemed
discriminatory is that they ‘act[] on or reproduce[] an aspect of the
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4. Reception
To our surprise, several scholars writing after the decision have
contended that Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion correctly captures
the plain or ordinary meaning of the statutory text. Some such
contentions appear to us as essentially reports of the author’s own


C M
Y K

12/21/2021 11:58:47

120 Id. at 21 (alterations in original) (quoting Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Eddie Murphy and
the Dangers of Counterfactual Causal Thinking About Detecting Racial Discrimination, 113 NW. U.
L. REV. 1163, 1172 (2019)).
121 Id. at 23.
122 Id. at 3.
123 See, e.g., id. at 19–25.
124 See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 81, at 56; John F. Manning, Separation of
Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1973 (2011).

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 51 Side A

category in a way that is morally objectionable,’”120 the brief reasons, it
follows that “[t]he real question to ask . . . is whether firing a person
for violating a sex-specific stereotype wrongfully limits a person’s
freedom and dignity in the specific capacities and manner that the
stereotype demands.” 121 Maybe so. But no genuine textualist would
deem that “the real question.”
If there were any doubt about the non-textualist commitments of
the philosophers’ brief, one striking fact should allay it. After once
quoting the statutory language, 122 the brief never returns to the actual
text. Instead, it maintains, repeatedly and without exception, that
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is discrimination
“because of sex,” not once calling it discrimination “because of such
individual’s sex.” 123
For a textualist, that casual conflation is
unacceptable because textual meaning is everything and different texts
presumably bear different meanings. 124 (An employer who doesn’t
hire Casey because Casey is a libertine, or has committed sexual
harassment in the past, might thereby discriminate “because of sex”
but not “because of Casey’s sex.”) Now, the signatories of the
philosophers’ brief might respond that the meaning or scope or legal
effect of the statute should not depend on the precise verbal
formulation chosen—whether the statute, by its terms, prohibits
“discrimination because of sex” or “discrimination because of an
individual’s sex” or “sex discrimination.” Very possibly, many
signatories and sympathetic others would privilege the principles that
underlie the text or show it in its best light over strict adherence to the
communicative content that happens to be encoded in very particular
statutory formulations. But we daresay that that’s what makes them
philosophers, not textualists (no offense intended, in either
direction).
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linguistic intuitions little supported by explanation or argument. 125
While these reports are not unworthy of regard, we think there is little
we can say in response beyond what we have said already. Here we
address two sets of scholars who have provided more elaborate defense
of the Bostock result on textualist grounds: first Andrew Koppelman,
and second the “empirical textualism” explored by Professors James
Macleod, Kevin Tobia, and John Mikhail.
Start with Koppelman. While we greatly admire his longstanding
campaign to secure legal protection against discrimination for gay and
lesbian people, and congratulate him on victory in Bostock, we find his
arguments regarding the statute’s ordinary meaning hard to credit.
He starts with the now-familiar assertion that “the plain language” of
the statutory text prohibits discrimination because of an individual’s
sexual orientation, 126 and that that is just what the text “literally
says.” 127 As we’ve already explained, these contentions are eccentric. 128
But Koppelman doesn’t stop here. Instead of acknowledging their
eccentricity, he treats it as uncontroversial that ordinary meaning was
on the plaintiffs’ side and proceeds to investigate the strategies—he
calls them “subtractive moves”—employed by those who would “nullify
or limit the effect of the language that is there.” 129 The first common
move, he says, and the one he thinks that Justice Alito pursued, was to
adopt an unduly constrictive theory of plain meaning. In Koppelman’s
view, there are two types of “plain meaning” of a text: “prototypical”
plain meaning and definitional or extensional plain meaning. 130 “The
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125 This is true, in our opinion, even of the best of scholars. Michael Dorf, for example,
asserts that “the textualist argument for the [Bostock] plaintiffs is very strong,” without
addressing the plain meaning of “sex” and “sexual orientation.” Dorf, supra note 5.
(Although we take issue with Dorf’s assessment of the textualist merits of the majority
opinion, we are in accord on other, and perhaps larger, issues the decisions raise. See supra
note 6.) Similarly, Tara Grove states that “[t]he text appeared to strongly favor the
plaintiffs: terminating a male employee because he is romantically attracted to men . . .
seem[s] like [an] instance[] of discrimination because of ‘sex.’” Grove, supra note 4, at
266. But, again, the statutory language proscribes discrimination “because of such
individual’s sex,” not “because of sex.” See supra note 123 and accompanying text. The
overwhelming majority of commentators have judged that terminating a male employee
because he’s attracted to men—i.e., because he’s gay—is not discrimination “because of”
that employee’s sex. As best we can tell, Grove does not explain why the case seems the way
it does to her.
126 Koppelman, supra note 5, at 3.
127 Id.
128 Although eccentric, they could still be right—about the “literal” meaning of the
statute—if something like Eidelson’s analysis of “A does Y because of B’s X” is correct. See
supra note 87. We’re not committed to any position regarding the text’s “literal” meaning
because the textualist touchstone is ordinary meaning, which textualists have long insisted
is other than literal meaning.
129 Koppelman, supra note 5, at 12.
130 Id. at 13.
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prototypical meaning is the meaning that most commonly occurs, and
which normally comes most easily to the mind of a reasonable
person.”131
Definitional meaning is all that falls within the
“extensions” of “the definition of a word.”132 An example: “‘bird’
prototypically means an animal that can fly.” 133 But definitionally, it
includes flightless members of Class Aves, such as ostriches and
penguins. 134 Koppelman’s diagnosis: Justice Alito interpreted the
statute against the plaintiffs because he ascribed the statute its
prototypical plain meaning while Justice Gorsuch properly ascribed it
its full extensional meaning. 135
This diagnosis does not fit the case. To be sure, we could imagine
a different case in which Koppelman’s proposed distinction between
prototypical and definitional meaning might prove illuminating.
Imagine a statute that prohibits employment discrimination “because
of [an] individual’s age.”136 If the social phenomenon that pushed the
legislature to pass this statute was always and only discrimination
against people who are thought to be too old, we might then imagine
debates over whether it prohibits discrimination on the basis that an
individual is thought too young turning on whether one adopts a
prototypical or definitional approach to plain meaning. But that is not
this case. This statute prohibits discrimination “because of [the]
individual’s . . . sex.” 137 Thus, here the question of plain meaning
turns on whether an “individual’s sex” means or encompasses an
individual’s sexual orientation. But it doesn’t, either as a matter of
prototypical meaning or as a matter of the full extension of the term’s
dictionary meaning. 138 Koppelman agrees with Justice Gorsuch that
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131 Id. at 14.
132 Id. Koppelman describes definitional plain meaning as “the definition of a word,
which encompasses all its logical extensions,” id., but has confirmed to us that the qualifier
“logical” is better omitted.
133 Id. at 13.
134 Bird, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bird
[https://perma.cc/M88A-HQ4U] (defining “bird” as “any of a class (Aves) of warmblooded vertebrates distinguished by having the body more or less completely covered with
feathers and the forelimbs modified as wings”).
135 Koppelman, supra note 5, at 15.
136 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) prohibits discrimination of people who are 40 or older “because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34
(2018).
137 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2018).
138 For dictionary definitions of “sex,” see supra note 86. The dictionary meaning of
“sexual orientation” is “a person’s sexual identity or self-identification as bisexual, straight,
gay, pansexual, etc. : the state of being bisexual, straight, gay, pansexual, etc.” Sexual
Orientation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sexual
%20orientation [https://perma.cc/9JE4-D2DZ].
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139 See supra subsection II.A.2.
140 Koppelman, supra note 5, at 8.
141 See Brief of Ryan T. Anderson as Amicus Curiae in Support of Employers at 6–7,
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (Nos. 17-1623, 18-107), 2019 WL 4014071.
142 Macleod, supra note 94; Kevin Tobia & John Mikhail, Two Types of Empirical
Textualism, 87 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=3729629 [https://perma.cc/4DZ3-UR4F].
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this dispute mirrors the issue in Oncale. But, as already explained, it
doesn’t. 139
In short, it seems to us, Justice Alito and his fellow dissenters did
not rely on any esoteric or confused notion of plain or ordinary
meaning. They were relying on the statute’s ordinary meaning, full
stop. They simply observed that if a gay male is fired because he’s gay
but not because he’s male, then he isn’t fired “by reason of” his sex. We
think that Koppelman, despite his protestations to the contrary, is not
relying on ordinary meaning. We suspect that he’s really relying on
some combination of but-for reasoning (discussed below) and a
conflation of (a) facts that must be known for an agent to draw a
warranted inference about a fact that is operative in their decision
making with (b) the operative fact itself. In particular, he states, “[i]n
order to determine whether someone is ‘homosexual,’ an employer
must take account of that person’s sex.” 140 That is false. What is true
is that, in order to determine whether somebody is homosexual (gay),
an employer who knows only the sex of a person’s romantic interests, must
know the person’s sex. But it is quite easy to know whether somebody
is gay without knowing their sex. If your friend tells you “my cousin
Lee is homosexual,” then you know (or have reason to believe) that
Lee is gay without knowing or taking account of Lee’s sex. 141
While Koppelman’s arguments and conclusion differ from ours,
his basic approach is much the same: heavy reliance on armchair
theorizing. But a very different approach might be possible. In two
fascinating articles, James Macleod and Kevin Tobia and John Mikhail
report survey results showing that slight majorities of ordinary speakers
would affirm, in response to short vignettes, that a gay man fired
because he’s gay is fired “because of his sex.”142 These surveys can be
read to endorse or assume textualism and to establish, contrary to what
the Bostock dissents assert and to what we argue here, that the ordinary
public meaning of the statutory text does support the plaintiffs—even
without recourse to Justice Gorsuch’s but-for analysis.
We think that would be a substantial overreading of the studies
because we do not think that textualists would or should take these
results at face value.
First, the results are more equivocal than the articles might be
read to suggest. For example, Macleod’s abstract announces flatly that
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143 Macleod, supra note 94 (manuscript at 1).
144 See also, e.g., id. (manuscript at 4) (asserting that “[m]ost respondents found the
statutory language plainly applicable to each type of employment discrimination tested”).
145 Tobia & Mikhail, supra note 142 (manuscript at 17).
146 Id. at (manuscript at 12–13).
147 Id. (manuscript at 14).
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“textualists’ ‘ordinary reader’ at the time of Title VII’s enactment
would have understood that it barred LGBT discrimination.”143 That
strikes us as a modestly aggressive reading of Macleod’s own data. 144
When asked whether discrimination against an employee because he’s
gay counts as employment discrimination “because of his sex,” 47% of
his respondents answered “clearly yes,” 13% answered “probably yes,”
17% selected “probably no,” and 23% said “clearly no.” This pattern
of responses seems as supportive of the conclusion that the locution
has no ordinary meaning than that it bears the ordinary meaning that
Justice Gorsuch claimed for it. In Tobia & Mikhail’s survey, 53% of
survey respondents answered that discrimination against an employee
because he’s gay counts as employment discrimination “because of his
sex,” while 47% said that it does not—a result that, given the margin
of error, is a statistical tie. 145
Second, disconcertingly large proportions of responses in Tobia
& Mikhail’s study are hard to explain on grounds other than
carelessness, confusion, or perversity. That study used diverse
scenarios and prompts to assess ordinary people’s linguistic intuitions
on four questions: (1) whether employment discrimination against
someone because they’re gay is employment discrimination “because
of [their] sex,” (2) whether employment discrimination against
someone because they’re transgender is employment discrimination
“because of [their] sex,” (3) whether employment discrimination
against someone because they’re pregnant is employment
discrimination “because of [their] sex,” and (4) whether employment
discrimination against someone because they’re in an interracial
marriage is employment discrimination “because of [their] race.” 146
In addition to investigating whether discrimination because of a nonstatutory “target” factor (sexual orientation, gender identity,
pregnancy, interracial marriage) counts as discrimination because of
the “statutory” factor (sex, race), the authors also tested whether
survey respondents correctly understood that discrimination on the
basis of the target factor counts as discrimination “because of” the
target factor itself. 147 Focus on the scenario in which the employer tells
employee Mike that he’s being fired because “I just don’t think that
having gay employees is good for business.” Some respondents were
asked, not whether Mike was fired “because of his sex,” but whether
he was fired “because of his sexual orientation.” Presumably, any
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Id. (manuscript at 17).
Id. (manuscript at 14).
See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
Tobia & Mikhail, supra note 142 (manuscript at 16).
Id.
Id. (manuscript at 17).
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competent English speaker who is paying attention should answer that
question in the affirmative. Yet, for each fact pattern (concerning
sexual orientation, gender identity, pregnancy, and interracial
marriage), a remarkable one of six respondents denied that firing
someone on the basis of X counted as firing them “because of X.” 148
Furthermore, the study also asked questions intended to learn
something about how respondents would undertake but-for analysis.
Here’s how the question was formulated for the sexual orientation
case: “Imagine that the above scenario were different in exactly one
way: Mike was not a man but was instead a woman named ‘Michelle,’
who is married to a man. Imagine that everything else about the
scenario was the same. Would Michelle still have been fired?” 149 This
question, like the one about the target factor, is essentially an
intelligence or attention check. Later, we will challenge Justice
Gorsuch’s claim—a claim that, in our judgment, Tobia and Mikhail
accept too uncritically 150—that the appropriate way to run the but-for
analysis on a case of a gay man like Mike is to use a straight woman like
Michelle. We will argue that the counterfactual Michelle must be gay,
not straight. But regardless of whether it is useful or revealing to
examine how the employer would have treated a straight woman, the
question is surely askable, and there is no doubt, based on the scenario
and prompt, what the right answer is: “No, straight Michelle would not
have been fired.” Yet 36% of the respondents answered that Michelle
would have been fired. 151 This is a mistake in reasoning, plain and
simple. (Roughly similar percentages of respondents—from 26% to
34%—made the same error in the other fact patterns.)152 Combined,
these defects paint a picture of survey respondents who are careless
and confused.
Third, patterns of responses across the scenarios further
undermine their reliability. While a slight majority of respondents
answered question (1) in the affirmative, larger majorities answered
questions (3) and (4) in the negative. 153 More respondents answered
that firing gay men and lesbian women alike is firing them “because
of” their sex than that firing pregnant women counts as firing them
“because of” their sex or that firing somebody for being in an
interracial relationship counts as firing them “because of” their race.
These are puzzling results because we are aware of no scholar or judge

C M
Y K

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 54 Side A

12/21/2021 11:58:47

1'/B%(50$1B(7B$/BB'2&; '2127'(/(7( 

2021]

BOSTOCK WAS BOGUS

30

97



C M
Y K

12/21/2021 11:58:47

154 In correspondence, Macleod proposed to explain the pattern on the basis that
there is less difference between (a) the durability of a gay person’s biological sex, and (b)
the durability of their sexual orientation than there is between either (c) the durability of
a person’s race, and (d) the durability of their attraction to or preference for a differentrace partner, or (e) the durability of a person’s being female, and (f) the durability of her
being pregnant. Email from James Macleod, Assistant Professor of L., Brooklyn L. Sch., to
authors (June 30, 2021 11:32 AM) (on file with authors).
155 Macleod, supra note 94 (manuscript at 1); see also Tobia & Mikhail, supra note 142
(manuscript at 3 & n.2).
156 John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2392–93 (2003)
(emphasis added).
157 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988) (emphasis added).
158 Cf. Macleod, supra note 94 (manuscript at 48 n.288) (explaining why textualists
“might prefer a more idealized conception” of the hypothetical reader in the statutory than
the constitutional context).
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who had anticipated this pattern of outcomes and we are not
persuaded by any explanation that would fully make sense of them.154
So what? Maybe nothing if, as the authors of these studies
emphasize, the textualist inquiry “is factual and empirical, not
normative.” 155 If the touchstone for a textualist is how the statistically
average person would have understood the statutory text, then maybe
the conclusion is that, because the average person has weird and
inexplicable linguistic intuitions, the ordinary meaning of the statutory
text is often weird and inexplicable, not something that the average
lawyer or judge will have access to just by consulting their own linguistic
intuitions. But that would be a disaster for textualism because it would
seem to entail that judges would be unable to intelligibly reason about
ordinary meaning and therefore must defer to whatever conclusions
the empiricists deliver. Survey results would dictate legal conclusions
in all cases.
In fact, though, committed textualists have often insisted that
ordinary meaning is not an entirely empirical inquiry, but rather a
partially normalized or idealized one. It “ask[s] how a reasonable
person, conversant with the relevant social and linguistic conventions,
would read the text in context,” 156 and seeks to “hear the words as they
would sound in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable user of
words.”157 In our view, these surveys powerfully demonstrate that the
“ordinary meaning” that textualism seeks cannot be wholly
determined by how the statistically average person, warts and all, would
understand statutory language, and that the approach does require
some nontrivial laundering of brute linguistic intuitions.158 What that
laundering involves is a big question that we cannot pursue here. The
crucial takeaway is only that, because ordinary meaning cannot be
unrefinedly empirical, surveys of the sort conducted by Macleod, Tobia
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and Mikhail are far less probative to textualists than might initially
appear. 159
*

*

*

By our count, of the thirty judges involved in these four lawsuits,
fourteen signed opinions that squarely addressed the plain or ordinary
meaning of the precise statutory language, and all of them concluded
or conceded that it would not have proscribed discrimination because
of the affected individual’s sexual orientation. 160 They could be wrong,
Sunstein’s examples might misfire, our linguistic intuitions might be
off, our doubts about the empirical textualist surveys and their
relevance might prove misguided. But if so, those who contend that
the plaintiffs had ordinary meaning on their side need a lot more
argument to make the case.
B. Counterfactual Confusions

C M
Y K

12/21/2021 11:58:47

159 We don’t read these authors to argue otherwise. See Macleod, supra note 94
(manuscript at 49); Kevin P. Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning, 134 HARV. L. REV. 726, 805–
06 (2020).
160 Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1758–59 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting);
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 148–49 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Lynch, J.,
dissenting); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 363 (7th Cir. 2017) (en
banc) (Sykes, J., dissenting). Kavanaugh’s contention that “[a]ll 30 judges” reached
judgments “based on the text of the statute,” 140 S. Ct. at 1824 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting),
misleads if it does not overstate.
161 See Blackman & Barnett, supra note 9 (observing that Gorsuch “pivots” and
“abandons . . . ‘ordinary meaning’ in favor of a specialized, technical legal meaning—what
lawyers refer to as a term of art”).
162 Grove, supra note 4, at 281.
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Justice Gorsuch’s opinion did not provide that argument. After
asserting that the content of our statutory legal norms is fully
determined by the “ordinary public meaning” of the statutory text, and
after observing that the ordinary meaning of “because of X” is “by
reason of X,” Justice Gorsuch never investigated whether the ordinary
public meaning of “by reason of sex” encompassed “by reason of
sexual orientation”—whether, that is, ordinary English speakers would
hold that somebody who fires lesbians and gay men alike because of
their sexual orientation fires them “by reason of [their] sex.” Instead,
Justice Gorsuch crucially and subtly changed the topic,161 replacing an
inquiry into ordinary public meaning with one into the “language of
law” and the specialized machinery it is said to embrace.
Tara Grove applauds this turn, deeming it exemplary of what she
calls “formalistic textualism,” and praising the opinion’s “almost
algorithmic feel.” 162 But if truly algorithmic decisionmaking has
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downsides, 163 not-algorithmic-reasoning in algorithmic dress can only
be worse. This section explains where Justice Gorsuch goes wrong, and
why a turn to but-for analysis does not change the straightforward
textualist conclusion that discrimination on account of an individual’s
sexual orientation is not encompassed within the statutory ban on
discrimination “because of such individual’s . . . sex.”
1. On Motivational and Non-Motivational Causation
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163 See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, Measuring Algorithmic Fairness, 106 VA. L. REV. 811
(2020); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias in, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218 (2019).
164 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (majority opinion) (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr.
v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 350 (2013)).
165 Or so we say. To anticipate a complexity that will require attention later, see infra
note 197 and accompanying text, note that even this judgment depends on contestable
assumptions about what Libby would have been like—and therefore what Libby would have
been doing at the time in question—had they not been an active Libertarian. Maybe if not
a Libertarian, Libby would have become a stamp collector and, because the local chapter
of the Philatelist Society was meeting when the Libertarians were, would still have arrived
at Riley’s too late to be seated.
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Recall the majority’s observation, quoting precedent, that “the
ordinary meaning of ‘because of’ is ‘by reason of’ or ‘on account
of.’”164 That’s not a throwaway; it’s important. The statute proscribes
employer conduct based on the reasons that caused or explained the
conduct (i.e., based on the employer’s motivation), and not on other
non-reason-based causes.
An example spotlights the difference. Suppose Libby intends to
dine one evening at Riley’s Restaurant. En route to Riley’s, Libby, a
member of the local Libertarian Party, stops at the Party’s office for a
short organizational meeting. When arriving at Riley’s, Libby is
chagrined to learn that the restaurant’s last table was taken minutes
earlier and that it will be accommodating no more diners that evening.
Libby’s political affiliation was a but-for cause of Riley’s declining to
serve Libby: if Libby hadn’t been a member of the Libertarian Party,
they’d have arrived at Riley’s ten minutes earlier, 165 in plenty of time
to secure the last table. But Riley’s did not decline to serve Libby
“because of” Libby’s political affiliation: that Libby is a Libertarian was
unknown to Riley’s or any of its agents and was no part of its decisional
calculus. Were Libby to sue Riley’s, alleging forbidden politicalaffiliation discrimination, they’d be laughed out of court (twice over).
The example generalizes: a fact or event can be a “but-for cause” of
some agent’s doing something without it being the case that the agent
did that thing “because of” that fact or event. (Here, to repeat, Libby’s
Libertarianism might have been a but-for cause of Riley’s not seating
them, without it being the case that Riley didn’t seat Libby “because
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of” Libby’s Libertarianism.) To gloss the statutory phrase “because of”
X to mean “by reason of” or “on account of” is to affirm this critical
point. 166
Unfortunately, in two quick sentences, the opinion threatens to
undermine what it has just accomplished. “In the language of law,”
Justice Gorsuch continues, “this means that Title VII’s ‘because of’ test
incorporates the ‘“simple”’ and ‘traditional’ standard of but-for
causation. That form of causation is established whenever a particular
outcome would not have happened ‘but for’ the purported cause.” 167
It’s a feat to sow so much mischief with such inconspicuous brevity.
In the first sentence, Justice Gorsuch purports to follow precedent
on a question that first divided the Court in Price Waterhouse: whether
a reason that motivated an adverse job action must have been a but-for
cause of that action when multiple motives were operative. 168 Prior
cases had interpreted “because of” language in other federal
antidiscrimination provisions to require full-blown but-for causation,169


12/21/2021 11:58:47
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166 See also, e.g., Texas Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
576 U.S. 519, 560 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“When English speakers say that someone
did something ‘because of’ a factor, what they mean is that the factor was a reason for what
was done.”). Admittedly, Justice Alito’s observation appears in a dissent, one joined by
Justices Roberts, Scalia and Thomas. But the majority decision, authored by Justice
Kennedy and joined by the four liberals, was decidedly non-textualist. See id. at 539
(majority opinion).
This is not to claim that “‘because of’ can mean nothing other than ‘motivated by.’”
Noah Zatz rightly argues against that claim. See Noah D. Zatz, The Many Meanings of “Because
Of”: A Comment on Inclusive Communities Project, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 68, 75 (2015).
But a textualist doesn’t need such a strong claim. On the central point for a textualist, we
think Justice Alito right: the communicative content of “because of” in relevantly similar
utterances—say, contexts concerning the wrongfulness or permissibility of acts undertaken
by an agent—is most often motivational, making the motivational reading the statute’s
“ordinary meaning.” To the extent that Zatz maintains otherwise, we disagree. But to the
extent he is arguing that “because of” must be given a broader meaning in antidiscrimination law to make sense of well-accepted precedents and to better achieve its
purpose and promise, see id.; Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers,
Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357
(2009), we agree. Again, we take these facts as evidence against textualism, not as evidence
against Justice Alito’s view of the statutory text’s ordinary meaning. (We thank Zatz for
pressing us on this point.)
167 Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020) (citation omitted) (quoting
Nassar, 570 U.S. at 347). For arguments against the use of but-for causation in motivational
analyses, see James A. Macleod, Ordinary Causation: A Study in Experimental Statutory
Interpretation, 94 IND. L.J. 957, 957 (2019); Andrew Verstein, The Failure of Mixed-Motives
Jurisprudence, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 725, 743 (2019).
168 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241–42 (1989); id. at 260 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id. at 262–63 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id.
at 281–82 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
169 Nassar, 570 U.S. at 347 (protected conduct discrimination in Title VII); Gross v.
FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175–180 (2009) (ADEA).
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2. On Not Changing “One Thing at a Time”
Putting aside our first objection, and assuming for argument’s
sake that but-for reasoning would be appropriate, let us attend
carefully to Justice Gorsuch’s application of the but-for test:
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170 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240–42 (1989).
171 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 2, 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071,
1075 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m)).
172 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) (2018).
173 Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020).
174 See also Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1745 (maintaining that “conversational conventions do
not control Title VII’s legal analysis, which asks simply whether sex was a but-for cause”).
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and Justice Gorsuch claims to be following suit. But that’s what the
Court had held in Price Waterhouse when interpreting the same
provision at issue in Bostock, 170 and Congress had responded by
amending the statute in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 171 Title VII now
provides that “an unlawful employment practice is established when
the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 172 Whether we
construe the 1991 Act as establishing that Price Waterhouse’s 1989
interpretation of the Title VII was mistaken or as changing what the
pre-1989 law had been, it’s a little audacious to state that Title VII’s
“because of” language in Title VII today incorporates but-for
causation.
But the greater danger lies in the second sentence. Even if the
status-based consideration that motivates an adverse job action must
fail the ordinary but-for standard, not the lessened “motivating factor”
standard, to be unlawful, it’s still not true that a given outcome counts
as occurring “because of” some fact, event, or purported cause
“whenever [that] . . . outcome would not have happened ‘but for’” 173
that fact, event or cause. That assertion ignores the critical point we’ve
just hammered: that the statutory language picks out actions that are
caused by facts or properties that play the right role in an agent’s
motivation (whatever “the right role” might be) and not those caused
by the same considerations operating non-motivationally. Libby’s
going to the Libertarian meeting was a “purported cause” but for
which the outcome in question (Riley’s not seating Libby) “would not
have happened,” but Riley didn’t not seat Libby “because of” Libby’s
going to that meeting. And once Justice Gorsuch loses sight of this
insight, he never regains it. Instead, he operates the but-for machinery
without regard for the difference between “by reason of X” and
“caused by X.”174

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 56 Side B

12/21/2021 11:58:47

1'/B%(50$1B(7B$/BB'2&; '2127'(/(7( 

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

102

30

[VOL. 97:1

[The] but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the
outcome changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause.
. . . So long as the plaintiff’s sex was one but-for cause of that decision,
that is enough to trigger the law.
....
. . . [I]t is impossible to discriminate against a person for being
homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that individual
based on sex. Consider, for example, an employer with two employees,
both of whom are attracted to men. The two individuals are, to the
employer’s mind, materially identical in all respects, except that one is a
man and the other a woman. If the employer fires the male employee for
no reason other than the fact he is attracted to men, the employer
discriminates against him for traits or actions it tolerates in his female
colleague. Put differently, the employer intentionally singles out an
employee to fire based in part on the employee’s sex, and the affected
employee’s sex is a but-for cause of his discharge. 175
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175 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739–41.
176 Gorsuch’s opinion shifts between the concept of sex (male/female) and gender
(man/woman). For simplicity, in this example, we uniformly use gender and the
man/woman binary. At times, our discussion of sexual orientation will employ both sex
and gender, to track the language of the relevant opinions and to mirror common usage.
Importantly, we are not dogmatic about the concepts that should properly inform the
term’s usage, but aim only to recognize its capacious meaning in common parlance.
177 See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 366 (7th Cir. 2017) (en
banc) (Sykes, J., dissenting) (making this point).
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Thus, under Justice Gorsuch’s application, there are purportedly
two relevant facts about Bostock: Bostock is (1) a man and (2) attracted
to men. 176 Changing (1), but keeping (2) constant, would result in
Bostock being a woman and attracted to men (and thereby
heterosexual).
Because the employer (presumably) does not
discriminate against heterosexual women, Bostock’s sex is a but-for
cause of his termination, and thus his termination constitutes
discrimination “because of” sex.
The first thing to note is that Justice Gorsuch has not applied the
but-for test as he told us he would. There are three relevant facts about
Bostock, not two. Bostock is (1) a man, (2) gay, and (3) attracted to
men. So, when “changing the employee’s sex,” Justice Gorsuch has
not kept everything else the same. 177 If we change (1) from a man to
a woman, then we can’t keep both (2) and (3) constant: by definition,
a gay woman is not attracted to men. So we must keep one and change
the other. The hypothetical woman version of Bostock must be either
(a) gay and attracted to women or (b) straight and attracted to men.
If we apply but-for reasoning to counterfact (a) rather than counterfact
(b), the conclusion changes: on the supposition that Clayton County
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would have fired any employee who manifests a same-sex attraction,178
then Bostock’s sex was not a but-for cause of his being fired. Thus
Justice Gorsuch’s choice to select the counterfact (or “comparator”)
he did (counterfact (a)), rather than the counterfact the employers
proposed (counterfact (b)) was itself a but-for cause of his bottom-line
conclusion regarding the scope of the statutory ban.
It cannot be denied that Justice Gorsuch did not do as he
described: he did not “change one thing at a time.” Of course, doing
so is impossible in this case because the distinct “things” are
conceptually interdependent: part or all of what it is to be gay is to be
attracted to persons of your same sex (or gender).179 But to say that it
was impossible for Justice Gorsuch to change only one thing is not to
say that he did change only one thing. He didn’t. The question thus
becomes whether the specification of the counterfact that Justice
Gorsuch selected when operationalizing the but-for test—a woman
who dates men and is straight—can be defended against the
specification that Clayton County offered—a woman who is gay and
dates women. 180
3. Why This Way Rather than That Way?
Unfortunately, Justice Gorsuch does not explain or justify his
choice of counterfact in a manner remotely commensurate with its
importance. 181 Only late in the opinion, after having already run the
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178 See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
179 See supra note 70, on the sex/gender distinction.
180 See also Brian Soucek, Hively’s Self-Induced Blindness, 127 YALE L.J. F. 115, 118 (2017)
(making this point pre-Bostock).
181 Similar observations apply to Tobia and Mikhail’s intriguing study and to their
conclusion that it “confirms that ordinary people largely endorse but-for causation” and
see “sex . . . as a but-for cause when someone is fired on account of their sexual
orientation.” Tobia & Mikhail, supra note 142 (manuscript at 20). This is misleading.
There are (at least) two distinct questions one might ask about deployment of the but-for
test in this context: (1) should the but-for test operate upon a counterfactual employee of
a different sex who shares (a) the factual employee’s sexual orientation (e.g., gay/straight)
or (b) their sexual attraction (e.g., to male/to female), given that it can’t share both? (2)
what output does the but-for test deliver when operating upon the correct counterfact?
Their survey question implicitly assumes, with Gorsuch, that the answer to (1) is (b). The
survey results then show that most people—albeit far fewer than one would hope for—
return the correct answer to (2), given (b): “no.”
But the thorny question, we have been emphasizing, is (1), not (2). No parties to
the litigation, and no contributors to the scholarly literature, disagree about the correct
answers to (2) for either answer to (1). What (sensible) people do disagree about is (1).
And, although the statement we quote from Tobia and Mikhail suggests that ordinary
people accept that (b) is the right answer to question (1), the survey results do not show
that because that’s not what the question asked for. Moreover, we believe that results of
this type of survey are incapable of answering question (1), even were the instrument
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but-for test on his preferred counterfact, does he so much as
acknowledge that an alternative counterfact even existed: “If the aim
is to isolate whether a plaintiff’s sex caused the dismissal, the employers
stress, we must hold sexual orientation constant—meaning we need to
change both his sex and the sex to which he is attracted.” 182 Because
the choice of counterfact is the key moment in but-for analysis, we
quote Justice Gorsuch’s response with minimal editing:
The employers might be onto something if Title VII only ensured equal
treatment between groups of men and women or if the statute applied only
when sex is the sole or primary reason for an employer’s challenged
adverse employment action. But both of these premises are mistaken.
Title VII’s plain terms and our precedents don’t care if an employer treats
men and women comparably as groups; an employer who fires both
lesbians and gay men equally doesn’t diminish but doubles its liability. . . .
Nor does the statute care if other factors besides sex contribute to an
employer’s discharge decision. Mr. Bostock’s employer might have
decided to fire him only because of the confluence of two factors, his sex
and the sex to which he is attracted. But exactly the same might have been
said in Phillips, where motherhood was the added variable. 183
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designed to elicit responses to that question, because the correct answer is determined by
theoretical criteria not empirical ones.
182 Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1747–48 (2020).
183 Id. at 1748.
184 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2018)
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Not only does this response to the employers come curiously late
in the game, the precise reasons Justice Gorsuch provides for rejecting
their preferred counterfact miss the boat.
Justice Gorsuch’s first response undercuts a premise that plays no
role in the defense of the proposition he’s challenging. Sure, if it’s
stipulated or already established that firing gay women under a policy
of firing all gay employees is statutorily forbidden discrimination and
that firing gay men under a policy of firing all gay employees is also
statutorily forbidden discrimination, then doing both things doubles
an employer’s liability. But whether such firings violate the statute is
precisely what’s at issue. The employers are urging that their
specification of the counterfact does a better job of ferreting out what
is at issue—whether discrimination against gay men and lesbian
women because of the single property the employer attribute to them
both (same-sex orientation) is discrimination “because of [their] sex”
within the ordinary meaning of the statute. 184 If they’re right, then
there’s no liability in the first place, thus nothing to double. Justice
Gorsuch’s argument to the contrary puts the cart (what conduct
violates the statute) before the horse (which counterfact should be
plugged into the but-for test that determines what violates the statute).
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185 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
186 See id. at 543 n.*, 544 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703,
75 Stat. 241, 255 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2018))).
187 See also Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1745.
188 See supra notes 100–104 and accompanying text.
189 For whatever it’s worth, sixty percent of the Tobia and Mikhail survey respondents
said that firing somebody because she’s pregnant is not firing her “because of her sex.”
Tobia & Mikhail, supra note 142 (manuscript at 15, 17).
190 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1742 (“Consider an employer with a policy of firing any
woman he discovers to be a Yankees fan. Carrying out that rule because an employee is a
woman and a fan of the Yankees is a firing ‘because of sex’ if the employer would have
tolerated the same allegiance in a male employee. Likewise here. When an employer fires
an employee because she is homosexual . . . , two causal factors may be in play—both the
individual’s sex and something else (the sex to which the individual is attracted . . . ).”).
One might have thought that the condition “if the employer would have tolerated the same
allegiance in a male employee” would have alerted its author to the disanalogy.
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Justice Gorsuch’s second response founders on a plainly confused
analogy that plays a disconcertingly prominent role in the majority
opinion. In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 185 the Court held that
discrimination against mothers but not fathers is discrimination
“because of such individual[s’] . . . sex.”186 That ruling, Justice
Gorsuch says, is universally recognized as right, by textualists and
others. Here and elsewhere in the opinion, Justice Gorsuch argues
that Phillips and Bostock stand or fall together. 187
Once again, 188 Justice Gorsuch is pressing a wholly disanalogous
case. Phillips involves employment discrimination on a basis—being a
mother—that is a true subset of one sex (or gender). It raises the
question whether adverse treatment of an individual on account of a
property that only women possess counts as discrimination “because
of” that individual’s sex when it is not a property that all women possess.
The Court answered that it does. We think that answer probably
correct, even as a textualist matter. (And if it wasn’t, then so much the
worse for textualism.) 189 But the property of being gay (or of being
straight) is not similarly a property that only, though not all, women
(or men) possess. In philosophical jargon, the property of being gay
is multiply realizable across men and women, as the properties of being
a women-who-is-a-parent or of being a woman-who-likes-the-Yankees 190
are not.
Still, that Justice Gorsuch’s own response to the employers is
obviously unsatisfactory does not establish that his conclusion was
mistaken. Can a supporter of his opinion do better on his behalf?
One possible approach is to assume that one of these two
specifications of the counterfact—that is, one of the two ways to
“change two things” when changing only one thing is impossible—is
“right” (or “correct” or “preferred”), that the other isn’t, and then to
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191 Will Baude mentioned in passing during a conversation at a conference that the
counterfact where only the sex/gender of the discriminated person is changed may be
preferable because sex/gender is, in some sense, more “fundamental” than sexual
orientation. On this nascent formulation of the argument, we think there are two
(correspondingly nascent) responses: (1) It is not obvious that sex/gender are more
fundamental, or appreciably more so, in comparison to sexual orientation. Sex/gender are
themselves complexes. (2) It is not clear that a property’s being more fundamental means
that it is more eligible to be changed in a counterfactual testing causation. As we discuss
below, insofar as we wish the counterfactual world to be as “close” as possible to the actual
world, we might prefer that we change some less fundamental property. Until then, the
reader might introspect on this puzzle: if you were you, except that you had a different sex,
would this counterfactual you retain your actual sexual orientation (e.g., straight, gay) or
your actual sexual attractors (e.g., females, women, males, men). We anticipate that
intuitions (among those who find the question sufficiently intelligible to entertain) will vary
widely, in content and in strength.
192 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741.
193 Id. at 1761–62 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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show that Justice Gorsuch isolated the right one. But we have not
heard a compelling reason why Justice Gorsuch’s imagined
counterfact would be right and employer’s proposed counterfact
would be wrong, or even that the former would be “better” or “more
accurate.” 191 Roughly speaking, the function of the but-for test is to
help identify whether a given factor or property had a causal impact.
An employer maintains that it fired its employee because of their
sexual orientation. In trying to figure out whether the employee’s sex
was also a but-for cause of their being fired, it can’t be that
counterfactual employees who share the actual employee’s sexual
orientation are categorically ineligible or disfavored. A clearer case of
stacking the deck is hard to imagine. And that Justice Gorsuch was in
fact guilty of illicit deck-stacking is made apparent by his stipulation
that the two employees he hypothesizes—a gay man who is attracted to
men and a straight woman who is also attracted to men—“are, to the
employer’s mind, materially identical in all respects, except that one is
a man and the other a woman.” 192 This is screamingly false to the facts
as stipulated: to the employer’s mind, the two employees are not materially
identical in all respects except that one is a man and the other a
woman; they are also non-identical in the respect that one is gay and
the other straight. And that latter material non-identicality is precisely
the one that, by hypothesis, motivated the employer. 193
Reassuringly, when we have discussed our concern with colleagues
sympathetic to Justice Gorsuch’s reasoning, few have urged that Justice
Gorsuch picked the right counterfact. The best response to our
challenge here that we have heard is only that both specifications of
the counterfact are equally eligible, and therefore that Justice Gorsuch
was either entitled or required to run the counterfactual as he did.
Take these two possibilities separately. The first—that the majority was
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legally entitled but not required to choose the plaintiffs’ preferred
counterfact over the employers’—maintains that when two
formulations of the counterfactual situation lead to different legal
results, the analyst has discretion over which to choose. This is
implausible. It would entail that one district court could choose one
counterfact, that a second could choose the other, that the different
choices would generate different legal conclusions on materially
identical facts, and that because neither court would be making a legal
error or abusing its discretion, both discordant results must stand.
Similarly, it would entail that if some justices prefer one counterfact
and some prefer the other, neither group has access to legal reasons
in its favor. The second possibility holds, in effect, that the plaintiff
has a legal right to their chosen counterfact: if the plaintiff can
construct any counterfactual that would yield the result that the
hypothetical plaintiff, with an altered protected characteristic, would
have not suffered an adverse employment result, then the plaintiff has
been discriminated against “because of” the protected characteristic.
Several commentators have endorsed this latter approach.194
We explain in the remainder of this Section why such
“counterfactual liberality” is mistaken. Before presenting that
argument, however, it’s worth noting one troubling upshot of Justice
Gorsuch’s position. Suppose the legislatures in North and South
Textalia are both considering whether to ban employment
discrimination and, if so, on what bases. Each legislature is considering
three options: (1) prohibiting discrimination “because of an
individual’s sex or because of their sexual orientation”; (2) prohibiting
discrimination “because of an individual’s sex”; or (3) enacting no
prohibition. After much debate, North Textalia enacts option (1) and
South Textalia enacts option (2). On Justice Gorsuch’s textualist
analysis, the law is actually the same in both jurisdictions because
discrimination “because of an individual’s sexual orientation” is
discrimination “because of an individual’s sex” as a matter of legal
meaning. This is so even though the fact that the legislators vigorously
debated the choice between (1) and (2) might seem near-conclusive
evidence that they accorded the phrases different meanings.
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194 See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 5, at 19; Victoria Schwartz, Title VII: A Shift from Sex
to Relationships, 35 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 209, 216 (2012) (“Nothing in the language of the
statute necessarily distinguishes between these two possible readings of the phrase, and
therefore facially both interpretations are plausible.”).
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4. Of Bisexuals and Pansexuals
There’s an even more troubling implication of Justice Gorsuch’s
but-for analysis: its application to bisexuals and pansexuals. 195 While
the precise meanings of these terms are dynamic and contestable,196
we take a bisexual person to be somebody who is attracted to cisgender
persons of both biological sexes, and a pansexual person to experience
romantic or sexual attraction to others regardless of their sex or
gender, including trans, nonbinary and gender fluid people. However
these terms may be defined, the difficulty is the same: Justice Gorsuch’s
reasoning renders employment discrimination against such persons
lawful.
Take Dana, a bisexual cisman. Dana dates ciswomen and cismen.
Employer fires Dana because Dana is bisexual. Is this a case of
discrimination because of Dana’s sex? Well, if Dana were a ciswoman
who dates ciswomen and cismen, she’d still be bisexual and still be
fired. So, on Justice Gorsuch’s analysis, Dana’s sex is not a but-for cause
of his being fired, which is to say that firing Dana was not an adverse
employment action “because of such individual’s sex.” As far as we can
tell, Bostock is universally understood as holding that employment
discrimination because of an individual’s “sexual orientation” is
unlawful. But on Justice Gorsuch’s own pivotal but-for analysis, that’s
an incorrect characterization of the opinion’s holding.
Homosexuality, heterosexuality, bisexuality and pansexuality are all
sexual orientations. Remarkably, though, on a but-for analysis, Title
VII prohibits employers from discriminating against a person because
they’re gay or straight, but not bi or pan. Is this not the clock’s
thirteenth chime?

The basic difficulty is well understood: but-for reasoning depends
upon a specification of the counterfactual situation, and alternative
specifications of that situation are possible. As Professor Michael
Moore explains, “[t]here is a great vagueness in counterfactual
judgments” that arises “in specifying the possible world in which we
are to test the counterfactual.” 197 For example, if the defendant had

195
196
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We’re grateful to Jonah Gelbach for prodding us to emphasize this implication.
See NIKKI HAYFIELD, BISEXUAL AND PANSEXUAL IDENTITIES: EXPLORING AND
CHALLENGING INVISIBILITY AND INVALIDATION (2021); Helen Bowes-Catton & Nikki
Hayfield, Bisexuality, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEXUALITY AND
GENDER 42 (Christina Richards & Meg John Barker eds. 2015).
197 Michael Moore, Causation in the Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (2019) (first
citing Robert H. Cole, Windfall and Probability: A Study of “Cause” in Negligence Law: Part I:
Uses of Causal Language, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 459 (1964); then citing Robert H. Cole, Windfall
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not supplied a defective piece of safety equipment, would they have
supplied a non-defective piece or none at all? The but-for test tells us
“to eliminate the defendant’s act,” but not “what are we to replace it
with.” 198 Therefore, in order to employ the test, we must choose
among alternative specifications of the counterfactual situation. But it
does not follow that all alternative specifications are equally eligible, or
that one who performs but-for analysis has unfettered discretion
regarding how to perform it.
To the contrary, as legal scholars of causation have long insisted,
the choice of a counterfactual situation is constrained by the
theoretical function that but-for reasoning serves. As Professor David
Robertson emphasized, the specification of the counterfactual is “the
trickiest” part of but-for reasoning. 199
One creates a mental picture of a situation identical to the actual facts of
the case in all respects save one . . . . It is important to stress that the mental
operation performed at this third step must be careful, conservative, and
modest; the hypothesis must be counterfactual only to the extent necessary
to ask the but-for question. 200
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and Probability: A Study of “Cause” in Negligence Law: Part II: Factual Uncertainty and Competitive
Fairness, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 764 (1964); and then citing DAVID LEWIS, COUNTERFACTUALS
(1973)), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-law/ [https://perma.cc/G9SJ9PNM]. As Moore explains, the difficulty of speculating about what would have happened
in the properly described counterfactual presents a second and distinct challenge.
198 Id.; see supra note 165.
199 David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1770
(1997).
200 Id. at 1770.
201 Robert N. Strassfeld, If . . . : Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 339,
343 (1992).
202 Id. at 344.
203 Id.
204 ROBERT C. STALNAKER, A Theory of Conditionals, in KNOWLEDGE AND CONDITIONALS:
ESSAYS ON THE STRUCTURE OF INQUIRY 156 (2019).
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Similarly, Professor Robert Strassfeld admonished that, “[i]f we
hope to use counterfactuals sensibly in the law, we need to clarify our
thinking about them.” 201 Unless we are to eliminate counterfactual
questions from legal analysis, “we should think carefully about when
and how to pose them, and how to distinguish good answers from poor
ones.”202 Most particularly, it is essential that “we distinguish a valid,
or plausible counterfactual, from an invalid, implausible, or downright
silly one.” 203
In his classic 1968 article A Theory of Conditionals, the philosopher
Robert Stalnaker urged that “among the alternative ways of making the
required changes, one must choose one that does the least violence to
the correct description and explanation of the actual world.”204 Many
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contemporary philosophical theories of causation, including
Stalnaker’s, use the language of “possible worlds” to articulate the
counterfactual conditions. 205 The basic idea is that we can think of all
the possible states of affairs—that is, ways the world might have been—
as “possible worlds.”206 Using possible world semantics, then, we can
describe but-for causation as follows: A is a but-for cause of B, if in the
possible world(s) where A doesn’t occur that is closest to the actual
world, B does not occur. 207 An advantage of this formulation is that it
does not fall victim to the rudimentary instruction to “change only one
thing”—which, as we have seen, might be impossible to fulfill. Here,
you can change more than one thing, but you must ensure that
changes are not superfluous, as superfluous changes will result in a
hypothetical world that is not as close to our world as other comparator
worlds and thereby distort the analysis.
Of course, this does impose a theoretical obligation to explain
how we adjudge what world is closest—and more generally what the
closeness relation is. 208 A fulsome explanation of the closeness relation
is a matter of great theoretical difficulty and is surely not possible in
this Article. But a modest start to wisdom on the topic should recognize that the context of the inquiry will matter. 209 If we employ the butfor causation test in the context of asking about whether certain
combinations of substances cause certain reactions, we will adjudge
closeness with an attention to chemistry; if we employ the but-for
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205 Id. (discussing use of possible world semantics in contemporary theories of
causation); Peter Menzies & Helen Beebee, Counterfactual Theories of Causation, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL.
(2019),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causationcounterfactual/ [https://perma.cc/D5CB-TCW9] (same).
206 Christopher Menzel, Possible Worlds, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (2016), https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/possible-worlds/ [https://perma.cc/Q49G-T6DT]; Menzies &
Beebee, supra note 205.
207 See David Lewis, Counterfactuals and Comparative Possibility, 2 J. PHIL. LOGIC 418, 420
(1973) (“If we cannot have an antecedent-world [where the counterfactual antecedent is
true] that is otherwise just like our world,” we can at least have “an antecedent-world that
does not differ gratuitously from ours; one that differs only as much as it must to permit the
antecedent to hold; one that is closer to our world in similarity, all things considered, than
any other antecedent world.”); see also Menzies & Beebee, supra note 205.
208 See JUDEA PEARL, CAUSALITY: MODELS, REASONING, AND INFERENCE (2000); JAMES
WOODWARD, MAKING THINGS HAPPEN: A THEORY OF CAUSAL EXPLANATION (Paul
Humphreys ed., 2003).
209 Menzies & Beebee, supra note 205 (discussing contextualism in the truth or
assertibility of causal claims); Randolph Clarke, Joshua Shepherd, John Stigall, Robyn
Repko Waller & Chris Zarpentine, Causation, Norms, and Omissions: A Study of Causal
Judgements, 28 PHIL. PSYCH. 279 (2015) (observing that people’s causal judgments are
context dependent); Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe, Cause and Norm, 106 J. PHIL.
587 (2009) (same).
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causation test in questions about morality, we might adjudge closeness
with an attention to morally similar possible worlds; and so on. 210
6. Possible Worlds and the Principle of Conservation in Motivational
Analysis

210 Menzies & Beebee, supra note 205 (discussing contextualism and providing an
example).
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To see whether we can put some flesh on the admittedly skeletal
constraint of keeping things as close to the actual world as possible, it
will be useful to consider a hypothetical variant on the actual case.
Suppose that Costock, male, is a fan of the Alabama Crimson Tide.
He’s fired because the head of the Clayton County Child Welfare
Agency is a fervent supporter of the Georgia Bulldogs and feels
animosity toward fans of the Bulldogs’ more successful rivals. Being a
fan of the Tide is not a protected characteristic. But being male is. So
Costock argues that he was fired “because of” his sex, in violation of
Title VII. Is this a sound claim?
Intuitively no, and it’s not close. Costock was not fired “by reason
of” his sex. He was fired by reason of his collegiate football loyalties,
misguided or traitorous as they seemed to his employer. Was Costock’s
sex a but-for cause of his being fired? Again, intuitively no. But
intuitions aside, the task is to change Costock’s sex to female, and ask
whether this female Costock is fired. Does this female Costock like the
Tide? Of course, we would say.
Not so fast, says Costock’s attorney, Corsuch. There are many
more than two things (that he’s male and that he likes the Tide) that
are true about actual (hypothetical) Costock. In addition, he was a
student in Miss Beverley Johnson’s 1995 fourth grade class at Lake
Ridge Elementary School, in Riverdale, Georgia. “So what?,” you ask.
So this: although football fandom is not a gendered affair in Georgia,
and although a great many Georgian girls and women root for the
Tide, it turns out that not a single girl from Costock’s fourth-grade class
was among them. Surprisingly enough, the distaff portion of that class
was comprised entirely of Bulldog fans—an oddity that Miss Johnson
and her colleagues remarked on more than once (though only
amongst themselves).
Here, then, are the relevant facts about Costock and the world in
which he found himself:
1. Costock is male.
2. Costock is a Tide fan.
3. Costock was in Miss Beverley Johnson’s 1995 fourth grade
class.
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211 Because we can’t change fact (1) while keeping constant all of (2), (3), and (4), the
question becomes whether the courts should run the but-for test on a counterfact that
incorporates the set {-(1), -(2), (3), (4)}, as Corsuch insists, or on a counterfact comprised
either of {-(1), (2), (3), -(4)} or of {-(1), (2), -(3), (4)}, as the employer maintains. The
intuition we aim to pump in the text is that, if we are investigating what would have
happened had Costock’s sex been different, we must keep (2) constant and relax either (3) or
(4); we express no view about which of (3) or (4) should be relaxed, and are skeptical that
the logic of counterfactual analysis furnishes a clear answer.
212 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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No female students in Miss Johnson’s 1995 fourth grade class
is or was a Tide fan.
If we run the but-for test on a counterfactual female Costock—
that is, if we change fact (1)—we cannot keep the remaining facts
constant. What to do? Because this is a case in which we manifestly
cannot change only one thing, Corsuch chooses to keep (3) and (4)
constant, not (2): the counterfactual female Costock, just like the
actual (hypothetical) Costock, was a student in Miss Johnson’s class,
but unlike Costock she doesn’t like the Tide. This hypothetical female
Costock is not fired. Therefore, Costock’s sex was a but-for cause of
his being fired, so he was fired because of his sex.
Silly, right? We hope you share our sense that, whatever might be
true of the actual Bostock case, this way to specify the counterfactual in
the hypothetical Costock case is plainly not kosher. It’s not that we can
keep constant that the female Costock likes the Tide, but that we must.
We don’t think it’s up to us to choose whether to keep constant either
the fact that this Costock likes the Tide or the fact that Costock was Miss
Johnson’s student in 1995 (or that no female who was in Miss
Johnson’s 1995 class likes the Tide). The logic of but-for inquiry, or
the logic and pragmatics of counterfactuals, provides—in this case at
least—that there is a right way to construct the counterfactual
antecedent and a wrong way. And Corsuch’s way is wrong. 211 The
challenge is to explain why. Where, exactly, has Corsuch gone wrong?
Put another way, this hypo disproves the Justice Gorsuch-friendly
supposition, proposed earlier, that if the plaintiff can construct any
counterfactual that would yield the result that the hypothetical
plaintiff, with an altered protected characteristic, would have not
suffered an adverse employment result, then the plaintiff has been
discriminated against “because of” the protected characteristic. 212
Does it also reveal something more affirmative or constructive?
We think that it does. We think that it points toward the following
theoretical stricture on the specification of counterfactuals when using
but-for analysis to identify explanatory reasons in motivational
analyses:
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The Principle of Conservation in Motivational Analysis (PCM): In performing
counterfactual analysis, when changing one fact requires changing other
facts too, the analyst must not change facts that are known, confidently
believed, or stipulated to have been among the actor’s motivating reasons
in favor of facts that are not likely, or less likely, to have been among the
actor’s motivating reasons.
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213 Of course, the cases differ in this respect: the impossibility of changing “only one
thing” is empirically contingent in Costock but conceptual in Bostock. Possibly, that
difference might matter to the ordinary meaning inquiry we discuss in Section II.A. Here,
however, we are investigating the constraints on but-for reasoning. If PCM explains what is
and is not kosher in cases like Costock, those who would hope to escape its strictures in the
Bostock case need to explain why PCM is inapplicable there. Merely citing the difference
that we acknowledge doesn’t do the trick. (We thank Katie Eyer for pressing us to clarify
this point.)
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This is a non–ad hoc general constraint on counterfactual
reasoning in motivational analyses. In Stalnaker’s terms, PCM does
“least violence” to the correct description and explanation of the
actual motivating reasons of the actor, which is our primary focus in
this motivational analysis. In the terminology of possible worlds, PCM
sets forth a way to pick out the closest worlds in the context of a
motivational analysis.
Take Costock. Recall that in determining what the relevant
counterfactual world is, we changed Costock’s sex from male to
female, and thus we were forced to choose among other facts about
Costock and his world that could not be kept simultaneously constant.
The antecedent of PCM is satisfied, entailing that we must not change
facts that are known or stipulated to have been operative in the actor’s
motivating reasons in favor of facts that are not likely, or less likely, to
have been operative in the actor’s motivating reasons. Here, we know
or stipulate that Costock was fired because of his Tide fandom, and we
have no reason to suspect that his employer cared at all about his
presence in Miss Beverley Johnson’s 1995 fourth grade class.
Accordingly, an analyst wielding the but-for test is required to keep (2)
constant, which is to say that the counterfactual female Costock who
serves as the comparator must be a Tide fan. In that counterfactual
world, female Costock is fired. So Costock was not discriminated
against because of his sex—just as anybody would intuit.
Now back to Bostock. 213 Recall the three relevant facts: Bostock is
(1) male, (2) gay, and (3) attracted to men. Many readers will have
the instinct that Justice Gorsuch’s decision to change the
counterfactual Bostock’s sexual orientation, (2), along with their sex,
(1), puts the rabbit in the hat. PCM makes clear why. As we saw, we
cannot change just (1), and must choose between changing either (2)
or (3). But it is stipulated for purposes of this analysis that the adverse
job action was “because of” the employee’s sexual orientation. In
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214 Bostock’s case arose on appeal from the grant of the employer’s motion to dismiss,
and thus assumed the allegations in the complaint, including the allegation that Bostock
was fired due to his sexual orientation. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 723 F.
App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). In each of the consolidated cases, the Supreme
Court assumed that the plaintiffs had been discriminated against on the basis of
“homosexuality” or “transgender status” in order to resolve the legal question of the scope
of Title VII. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
215 See supra note 197, observing the difficulty in counterfactual reasoning of
speculating about what would have happened in the properly described counterfactual.
216 See Marty Lederman, Thoughts on the SG’s “Lesbian Comparator” Argument in the
Pending Title VII Sexual-Orientation Cases, BALKINIZATION (Sept. 6, 2019), https://balkin
.blogspot.com/2019/09/thoughts-on-sgs-lesbian-comparator_6.html
[https://perma.cc
/8DD6-ML8L].
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contrast, it is not stipulated, and is doubtful on its face, that the fact,
alone, that an individual is attracted to men is among the employer’s
motivating reasons for firing them—that is why the Gorsuchian
specification of the counterfactual yields the conclusion that it does.
Thus, choosing an alternative world in which Bostock is female, but
also straight, violates PCM.
What PCM mandates, of course, is that, when we imagine what
Clayton County would have done in the counterfactual world in which
Bostock was female not male, the counterfactual Bostock must be gay.
That’s because, for purposes of resolving the legal question that these
cases present, it is stipulated that Bostock’s sexual orientation was a
motivating reason that explained his firing. 214 At the same time, we
have no reason to believe that the bare property of being attracted to
men was operative in Clayton County’s motivating reasons. The
proper specification of the counterfact, accordingly, is just as the
employer urged: if we change fact (1), we must keep constant fact (2)
and change fact (3). We then ask whether Clayton County would have
fired this gay female in Bostock’s position. If so, Bostock’s sex was not
a but-for cause of his being fired, and he wasn’t fired “because of” his
sex.
What would Clayton County have done in this situation? In
candor, we don’t know. Perhaps nobody does. We do not insist that,
in the counterfactual scenario, Clayton County would have fired
Bostock had Bostock been a gay female instead of a gay male, all else
equal. 215 Anti-gay biases are complex and one cannot assume that an
employer who discriminates against a gay male because he’s gay would
similarly discriminate against a gay female because she’s gay. And if
Clayton County would not have fired a gay female in Bostock’s shoes,
then it would be guilty of discrimination on the basis of sex in addition
to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 216 But that
question is a different one than Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion
considered, for the Bostock defendants conceded that they’d be guilty of
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illegal sex discrimination if a factfinder were to find that they
discriminated against him because he’s a gay male and would not have
treated a lesbian female the same. 217
Yet more importantly, even if record evidence might permit a
factfinder to conclude that, more likely than not, this employer would
not have terminated a lesbian female employee as it terminated a gay
male employee, that sort of heavily fact dependent analysis could not
possibly support the broad legal rule that emerges from the decision—
namely that a categorical and consistently applied employment ban on
gay employees constitutes legally prohibited discrimination because of
the affected individuals’ sex. 218 Removing the fact that the person is
gay does great and unnecessary violence to our ability to explain what
did in fact happen in the real world. 219
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217 Brief for Petitioners Altitude Express, Inc. and Ray Maynard at 33–36, Bostock, 140
S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (No. 17-1623), 2019 WL 3958415; Brief for Respondent at 28, Bostock,
140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (No. 17-1618), 2019 WL 3942896.
218 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. Counsel for the plaintiffs, Professor
Pamela Karlan appeared to concede this point at oral argument. Transcript of Oral
Argument at 69, Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (Nos. 17-1618, 17-1623) (“If there was that
case [as Justice Alito described in which an interview only ascertained sexual orientation
and not sex], it might be the rare case in which sexual orientation discrimination is not a
subset of sex.”); Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1759 (Alito, J., dissenting) (referencing Professor
Karlan’s response in oral argument).
Gorsuch responds:
Even in this example, the individual applicant’s sex still weighs as a factor in
the employer’s decision. Change the hypothetical ever so slightly and its
flaws become apparent. Suppose an employer’s application form offered a
single box to check if the applicant is either black or Catholic. If the
employer refuses to hire anyone who checks that box, would we conclude
the employer has complied with Title VII, so long as it studiously avoids
learning any particular applicant’s race or religion? Of course not: By
intentionally setting out a rule that makes hiring turn on race or religion,
the employer violates the law, whatever he might know or not know about
individual applicants.
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1746.
This is another glaring disanalogy. In Gorsuch’s hypo, the employer’s policy
ensures that anybody with either of two protected traits—being Black or being Catholic—
is not hired, although the unusual structure prevents the employer from knowing, in an
individual case, which protected trait does the dirty work. In Justice Alito’s example,
nobody is discriminated against for the bare possession of a protected trait. In general, the
difference between a disjunction (the way that race and religion operate in Gorsuch’s
example) and a compound (the way that sex operates in Justice Alito’s) is not, as Gorsuch
wishes, “ever so slight[].”
219 While PCM must be respected when the conditions for its application obtain, those
conditions obtain only rarely. PCM applies whenever two conditions hold: (1) in
conducting a counterfactual analysis, the analyst must change a property or fact F which
requires the analyst to make other changes, say, either to F1 or to F2; and (2) the actor acted
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Three decades ago, Robert Strassfeld urged scholars, lawyers, and
judges to pay greater attention to the do’s and don’t’s of counterfactual analysis. So long as courts lack “a general understanding of
counterfactuals and their place in legal decisionmaking,” he astutely
cautioned, their “treatment of legal counterfactuals” is bound to be
“ad hoc, localized, and inconsistent.” 220 Enter Justice Gorsuch’s
majority opinion in Bostock.
*

*

*

In his dissent, Justice Kavanaugh criticizes the majority for
privileging “literal meaning” over “ordinary meaning.” 221 Similarly,
Professors Josh Blackman and Randy Barnett praise Justice Gorsuch
for his “airtight reasoning,” complaining only that it wasn’t truly
textualist. 222 But these conservative critics let Justice Gorsuch off the
hook too easily. As we have shown, even if the majority’s result as to
sexual orientation “fits with” the text in some loose, impressionistic
sense, it reflects neither its ordinary meaning nor any technical legal
meaning delivered by but-for reasoning.
C. And Gender Identity?

By discriminating against homosexuals, the employer intentionally
penalizes men for being attracted to men and women for being attracted
to women. By discriminating against transgender persons, the employer
unavoidably discriminates against persons with one sex identified at birth
and another today. Any way you slice it, the employer intentionally refuses
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“because of” F1. PCM says that in those limited cases, the analyst cannot leverage the
necessity captured in (1) to change F1, but must instead let F2 vary in conjunction with F.
220 Strassfeld, supra note 201, at 348.
221 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1824–25 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
222 Blackman & Barnett, supra note 9.
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We’ve argued that employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation as such does not constitute illegal sex discrimination
if Title VII is subject to bona fide textualist interpretation. We’ve also
said that discrimination on the basis of gender identity, gender
expression, or the fact that somebody identifies as transgender is illegal
sex discrimination, even for a textualist. In short, we think that, from
a textualist point of view, Justice Gorsuch and the majority got things
wrong in Bostock but right in Harris Funeral Home. Because we’re
defending a position that attracted no textualist Justice in Bostock, we
close this Part by explaining our view on gender identity, and related
matters.
At first blush, the cases do seem on par, legally speaking. As
Justice Gorsuch reasoned:
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to hire applicants in part because of the affected individuals’ sex, even if it
never learns any applicant’s sex. 223
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223 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1746 (majority opinion).
224 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1823 n.1 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Although this opinion
does not separately analyze discrimination on the basis of gender identity, this opinion’s
legal analysis of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation would apply in much the
same way to discrimination on the basis of gender identity.”).
225 See, e.g., Corpus-Linguistics Scholars Brief, supra note 106, at 15, 24–26 (providing
data that the word “sex” encompassed “gender”).
226 See, e.g., Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Thus, under
Price Waterhouse, ‘sex’ under Title VII encompasses both sex—that is, the biological
differences between men and women—and gender.”).
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Here, we think, is a particularly forceful way to put Justice
Gorsuch’s point: When A discriminates against B because they’re gay,
A is responding to a certain fact about or property of B’s sex—namely,
WKDW % V VH[ Ǧ & V VH[ ZKHUH & VWDQGV IRU DQ DFWXDO RU SRWHQWLDO
URPDQWLFSDUWQHURI% VDQGZKHUHǦUHSUHVHQWVQRQFRQJUXHQFHQRW
inequality).
When A discriminates against B because they’re
transgender, A is responding to a different fact about or property of
B’s sex—QDPHO\WKDW% VVH[Ǧ% VJHQGHU:KHQIRUPXODWHGWKLVZD\
it might well seem that if the second noncongruence constitutes
discrimination because of B’s sex then the first noncongruence must
too. 224
To understand why the cases differ, we must first address a more
basic question: does Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination because
of an individual’s “sex” forbid discrimination because of an
individual’s sex or because of an individual’s gender? A quick answer is
that the statutory term “sex” covers sex, not gender. But that would be
too quick, and mistaken. Our current conceptual schema that
distinguishes sex (a biological category) from gender (a social
category) was not the schema of the authors of Title VII, or its
audience. And once we break a single lexical concept represented by
a word in the statute (“sex”) into two distinct lexical concepts (sex and
gender), it’s an open question what sense to make of an earlier
invocation of the word in light of our new conceptualization. (After
all, even though we call sex “sex” and gender “gender,” we could have
called them “sex 1” and “sex 2.”) Once you look, it’s fairly evident that
the word is widely used to mean sex or gender, or both sex and gender
indiscriminately, both in 1964 and today. 225 We aren’t doctrinaire
about this conclusion. We are receptive to evidence, including
empirical evidence, to the contrary. But we note that we aren’t alone
in this interpretation. Courts have interpreted the statute in that
commonsensical manner. 226
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227 Macleod, supra note 94 (manuscript at 34) (alteration in original) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2018)). The Macleod and Tobia & Mikhail surveys both found
more support for the proposition that employment discrimination against transgender
people counts as discrimination “because of [the] individual’s . . . sex” than that
discrimination against gay people does. Id. (manuscript at 30, 34); see also Tobia & Mikhail,
supra note 142 (manuscript at 19).
228 We assume here that the status of being trans or cis is independent of one’s gender.
This is option (1) in the paragraph above.
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That observation has relatively straightforward implications for
discrimination on account of an individual’s being transgender.
Transgender status and cisgender status are both properties
identifying a particular relationship between one’s sex and one’s
gender. Thus, these concepts are relationships between sex and
gender, which are themselves the two children concepts of the parent
concept sex. It is not surprising that the meaning of “sex” would
encompass facts about the relationship between these two children
concepts. Again, here we think that as a matter of empirical fact
regarding ordinary meaning, the term “sex” does encompass
transgender and cisgender status. This could be so on either of two
theoretical accounts: (1) because “sex” refers (a) to sex (e.g., male or
female) and (b) to gender (e.g., man or woman) and (c) to the
relational property that one’s sex has to one’s gender (e.g., cis or trans)
or (2) because “sex” refers (a) to sex and (b) to gender, and because
gender encompasses not man and woman (unmodified), but cisman,
ciswoman, transman, and transwoman as four distinct gender values.
Either way, an employer who subjects trans people to more
burdensome “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” than it
subjects cis people to discriminates “because of such individual’s . . .
sex” as a matter of ordinary statutory meaning.227
How, finally, would the but-for test operate? Take an employer
who adopts and follows a blanket policy of not employing trans people.
Pursuant to this policy, it fires Jack, a transman. Does but-for analysis
reveal that it fired Jack “because of [his] sex”? Jack has three relevant
properties: his biological sex is female, he identifies as a man, and he
is transgender. 228 If we change his biological sex, then we cannot
preserve both the other facts; we must imaginatively change at least
one. Justice Gorsuch would change, in addition to Jack’s sex, the fact
that he is transgender. Because the employer does not fire this
counterfactual Jack (male, man, cisgender), the but-for test generates
the conclusion that Jack was fired because of his sex. Consistent with
what we argued in Section II.B., and the principle of conservation of
motivational analysis, we, unlike Justice Gorsuch, would change Jack’s
sex and his gender identity, keeping constant his status as transgender.
Because the employer does fire this counterfactual Jack (male, woman,
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transgender), our deployment of the but-for test yields the conclusion
that Jack was not fired because of his sex.
Does this conclusion embarrass our analysis? Not at all. First, we
are not recommending use of the but-for test to determine whether
discrimination on account of a person’s being transgender is
discrimination “because of that individual’s sex” as a textual matter
when a direct textual inquiry—an inquiry into how people would use
and understand the locution—already establishes that it is. Recall that
the use of technical tests or legal devices is not the first recourse for
textualists. Second, we have here imagined an employer who fires Jack
according to a strict sex- and gender-neutral policy of not employing
trans people. But many or most cases have not been like that. Instead,
an employer reacts in a one-off fashion to a particular trans person,
often firing them post transition. In such cases, counterfactual
reasoning will most likely identify that very person, pre-transition, as
the most illuminating comparator, not some hypothetical construct
possessing some but not all of the actual individual’s qualities.
Remember that counterfactual reasoning is not a game played
according to strict rules, but a tool designed to help us better
understand what actually happened in the world, which is why we
should always select a counterfactual world that does least violence to
the actual world. And if the appropriate comparator is the employee
pre-transition, then the conclusion follows that their gender was a butfor cause of the termination. And since “sex” encompasses gender,
once again the employee was discriminated against “because of [their]
sex.”
The bottom line, to summarize, is that the analyses of sexual
orientation discrimination and discrimination based on transgender
status are importantly distinct. Sexual orientation discrimination is
not, as a textual matter, discrimination “because of such individual’s
sex” because: (1) the ordinary meaning of “because of an individual’s
sex” does not encompass actions taken on account of an individual’s
sexual orientation; and (2) the but-for test does not generate a
different conclusion when operationalized in a theoretically defensible
way. In contrast, discrimination based on transgender status will
(likely) be, as a textual matter, discrimination “because of such
individual’s sex” because the ordinary meaning of “sex” does
encompass transgender status. However, if the ordinary meaning of
“sex” were not to encompass transgender status, then a blanket policy
of discriminating against transmen and transwomen would not be
discrimination “because of such individual’s sex,” at least as a matter
of but-for causation. That is because the but-for test, equipped with
PCM, will fail to show that the person’s sex was a but-for cause of their
discrimination.
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OF PURPOSES AND PLURALISM

What follows? Conservatives say the dissents were right: Title VII
does not reach sexual orientation and gender identity. 229 But there’s
another possibility: the law does reach sexual orientation and gender
identity, but the textualist method that all the conservatives purported
to apply is the wrong approach to statutory interpretation.
If textualism is wrong, what’s right? The standard answer is:
“purposivism,” an approach that supposedly follows the legislature’s
broad social purposes rather than the meaning of the words it chose. 230
However that answer is misleading in two fundamental respects.
First, the class of aims or objectives that are grouped as “purposes”
is heterogeneous and needs to be subdivided.
To be sure,
commentators who endorse a simple textualist/purposivist binary
often note that different types of things are called legislative
purposes. 231 But they too often dismiss that fact as of little importance,
or as marking only differences in degree. 232 We think that attending
carefully to the distinguishable types of aims and objects that the words
“purpose” and “intent” sometimes reference is closer to the start of
wisdom than a detail to be passed over.
Among the more important differences lies between “legal
intentions” and “social purposes” (or “policy goals”). A legal
intention is the change in the law that the legislature intended to effect
by means of enacting a given statutory text—that is, say, the intention
to reshape an existing legal duty or create a new legal right or confer
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229 See, e.g., Lund, supra note 10, at 159.
230 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: TwentiethCentury Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshell, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1731, 1744–45 (1993);
Grove, supra note 4, at 267 (“The academic debate tends to focus on whether an interpreter,
particularly a judge, should be a ‘textualist’ or a ‘purposivist.’” (first citing Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., The Statutory Interpretation Muddle, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 269, 278–79 (2019); then
citing David S. Louk, The Audiences of Statutes, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 137, 148 (2019); and
then citing Kevin M. Stack, The Interpretive Dimension of Seminole Rock, 22 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 669, 683 (2015))); Koppelman, supra note 5, at 9 (“The new textualism is typically
contrasted with purposivism . . . .”).
231 John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70,
85–87, 91 (2006) (distinguishing “Legal Process purposivism” as a “dominant version” of
purposivism, but exploring the different varieties of purposivism no further); Eskridge,
supra note 230, at 1744–45 (identifying the criticism of purposivism that there are many
different kinds that may count as relevant purposes, but failing to further investigate the
distinctions); Grove, supra note 4, at 272 n.38 (identifying differences in the potential
objects of purposivism, but “treat[ing]” them all “under the [same] umbrella” in
juxtaposition with textualism).
232 See supra note 231; see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., ABBE R. GLUCK & VICTORIA F.
NOURSE, STATUTES, REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION: LEGISLATION AND
ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 303 (2014) (failing to distinguish between
legislative “intent[ions]” and meanings).
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a power. A social purpose or policy goal is the change in the world that
the legislature intended or hoped to bring about as a consequence of
changing the law in the way the legislature intended that it be changed.
For example, the “purposes” that animated the Congress that enacted
Title VII might have included the legal intention to establish a legal
duty of employers not to discriminate on the basis of an individual’s
sex and the policy goal of thereby advancing the economic and social
equality of women and men. Legal philosophers have marked this
distinction time and again. 233 The distinction is hugely important
because the usual and most powerful arguments against interpreting a
statute to effectuate policy goals are weak or even impotent as
arguments against interpreting the statute to effectuate the
legislature’s legal intention. Thus, to understand the best alternative
to textualism our theorists of statutory interpretation must carefully
attend to this distinction and its implications.
Second, whether purposes be cashed out in terms of legal
intentions, or policy goals, or anything else, virtually nobody is a
purposivist in the same single-minded way that defines textualism.
Statutory textualism, like standard versions of constitutional
originalism, is a monistic thesis. It’s a claim about the sole determinant
of legal content, or the sole target of appropriate or legitimate judicial
interpretation. 234 So-called purposivists are rarely monistic. They
rarely fasten on any one type of legislative purpose as the single target
that interpreters should seek. Much more commonly they’re
pluralists. 235 They believe that statutory interpretation—like constitutional interpretation—draws on many factors: original textual
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233 See, e.g., Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the
Study of Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE
LAW 217, 241 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011); John Gardner, Legal Positivism:
5½ Myths, in LAW AS A LEAP OF FAITH: ESSAYS ON LAW IN GENERAL 51 (2012); Berman, supra
note 59, at 796–99.
234 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 22–23 (1997) (stating the position that judges should attend to only what the
words in the statutory text mean); Grove, supra note 4, at 269 (explaining the strong
emphasis of formalist textualism on “semantic context”).
235 See, e.g., Anuj C. Desai, Text Is Not Enough, 93 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 3); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 2019
Term—Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 57 (1994) (stating that “the Court
does not adhere to any single foundation for statutory meaning, but has traditionally
followed a multi-factored, pragmatic approach to statutory interpretation that shows certain
regularities”); Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1764 (2010)
(“There are different stripes of purposivists, but, as relevant to this project, what unites
them is this emphasis on pluralistic sources of statutory meaning and interpretive flexibility
over formalistic methodological rules.” (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 125 (1994))).
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236 Regarding constitutional interpretation, see Mitchell N. Berman, Our Principled
Constitution, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1325, 1342 (2018).
237 See, e.g., Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e–2(a)(1)); Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc.,
173 F.3d 988, 993–4 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)); DeffenbaughWilliams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 588–9 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e–2(a)(1)); .
238 Brief in Opposition, supra note 105, at 31–36 (Zarda); see Brief for Petitioner, supra
note 105, at 18–24 (Bostock).
239 Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1765 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
240 Id.; see also William N. Eskridge Jr., Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex
Discrimination Argument for LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322, 346 (2017)
(observing that “the original meaning of Title VII is that antimiscegenation employment
policies violate Title VII, even though they do not involve ‘differential treatment’ for black
and white employees (who are treated alike by the employer who does not tolerate
interracial intimacy)” and arguing for the analogy to sexual orientation discrimination).
241 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 (2018).
242 Id.
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meaning, current meaning, legislative intentions and broader
purposes, historical practice, avoiding absurd unforeseen results, the
polity’s current moral commitments if sufficiently deep or widespread,
and so forth. 236 Usually, these factors mostly align. When they don’t,
it’s a hard case and no single factor is always decisive.
That approach will seem radical to some. Justice Alito’s dissent
confirms that it’s not. Before Bostock was decided, lower courts had
already held that Title VII’s ban on discrimination “because of [an
employee’s] . . . race” encompasses employers who fire employees for
being in an interracial relationship. 237 The Bostock plaintiffs argued
that their situation was on par: if discrimination “because of race”
covers discrimination against people in opposite-race relationships,
then discrimination “because of sex” must cover discrimination
against those in same-sex relationships. 238
The analogy is structurally perfect. But Justice Alito’s dissent
rejected it, chiding plaintiffs for not “taking history into account.”239
The interracial-relationship cases are rightly decided, Justice Alito
explained, because the “employer is discriminating on a ground that
history tells us is a core form of race discrimination.” 240
Justice Alito is right to heed the lessons of history. But he does so
in a manner that gives the textualist game away. Title VII’s text does
not prohibit “core forms of race discrimination.” 241 It prohibits
discrimination against an individual “because of such individual’s
race.” 242 And the version of textualism that would deliver the former
meaning from the latter text while earning the Scalia/Alito seal of
approval is not easy to conceive. Moreover, one might infer, if
discrimination against an individual because they’re in a same-sex
relationship is not—as a “textual” matter—discrimination “because of
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243 Ilya Somin, Textualism and Purposivism in Today’s Supreme Court Decision on
Discrimination Against Gays, Lesbians, and Transsexuals, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 15, 2020)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 (2018)), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/06/15
/textualism-and-purposivism-in-todays-supreme-court-decision-on-discrimination-againstgays-lesbians-and-transsexuals/ [https://perma.cc/53LH-8XP6].
244 See supra subsection II.A.4.
245 Tobia & Mikhail, supra note 142 (manuscript at 6, 19) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–
2 (2018)).
246 Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1755 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 81, at 16).
247 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
248 See, e.g., Adams v. Governor’s Comm. on Postsecondary Educ., No. C80–624A, 1981
WL 27101, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 3, 1981) (rejecting an associational discrimination claim,
because “[n]either the language of the statute nor its legislative history supports a cause of
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such individual’s . . . sex,” then neither is discrimination against
someone because they’re in an interracial relationship discrimination
“because of such individual’s race.”243
Now, that inference is not ironclad. Insofar as textualism is an
empirical project, 244 it is not governed by ethical or logical injunctions
to treat likes alike. It could be that sexual-orientation discrimination
does not run afoul of the original ordinary public meaning of Title VII
while interracial-relationship discrimination does. (Or conversely, for
that matter.) But if so, Justice Alito or likeminded others need to come
up with far more argument than his Bostock dissent supplies. In the
meantime, they’ll find little comfort in the Tobia and Mikhail survey
results that show 60% of respondents denying that firing somebody for
being in an interracial relationship counts as firing them “because
of . . . [such] individual’s race.”245
To be sure, as Justice Alito faithfully incants, the duty of a
textualist judge “is to interpret statutory terms to ‘mean what they
conveyed to reasonable people at the time they were written.’”246 But
there are reasons to bet that firing somebody because they’re in an
interracial relationship is, if anything, less likely to fall within the
original ordinary meaning of the statutory text than within the current
ordinary meaning. For one thing, there is no mention in the legislative
history of Title VII that anti-miscegenation discrimination would be a
form of discrimination actionable under Title VII, even though that
time period was rife with such discrimination. Moreover, after Loving
v. Virginia, 247 such discrimination came to be known by the term
“associational discrimination,” which indicates that people did not
comfortably file it under the heading “racial discrimination,” making
it especially improbable that they’d describe it as discrimination
“because of such individual’s race.” Finally, early textualist judicial
decisions rejected claims that the statute covered associational
discrimination. 248
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action for discrimination against a person because of his relationship to persons of another
race”); Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205, 208–09 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (ruling that
the ordinary meaning of Title VII does not reach associational claims).
There are cases that have contrary rulings, but they tend to be predicated on a
causal analysis and not the ordinary meaning of the statute. Deffenbaugh-Williams v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 588–89 (5th Cir. 1998); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life
Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986); Gresham v. Waffle House, Inc., 586 F. Supp.
1442, 1445 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Holiday v. Belle’s Rest., 409 F. Supp. 904, 908–09 (W.D. Pa.
1976); Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1366
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
249 See Soucek, supra note 180, at 124–25; Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as
Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167, 171–72 (2004).

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 67 Side B

Does this mean Justice Alito was wrong about the legal protection
afforded interracial relationships? Not at all. He was wrong to think
that the correctness of the many judicial decisions holding that Title
VII bans employment discrimination against persons in interracial
relationships depends upon any fixed meaning (i.e., “communicative
content”) the statutory text carried at the time of enactment.
However, it would also be wrong to think that the propriety of this
interpretation of the statute necessarily depends upon the contents of
the genuine legal intentions or policy goals of the enacting Congress—
for example, that the 88th Congress had the intent or purpose to
prohibit employment discrimination “on the basis of an employee’s
involvement in an interracial relationship” or action “that is wrongful
in the same way that discrimination because of an individual’s race is
wrongful.” (Introspect: is your judgment that an employer violates
Title VII when firing an employee because they’re in an interracial
relationship contingent on what a historian of the 1964 Act might
disclose?) A pluralist’s analysis is likely to be complicated. But the
much-simplified bottom line, in our judgment, is that a national
commitment to combatting social practices that are rooted in, and
further, white supremacy and racial subordination is properly
attributed to or located within Title VII, partly because of the values
that animated the enacting Congress and partly because of the values
that are embedded in our legal order today. We believe that that’s
what history really teaches. And that’s why Title VII prohibits some
race-based discrimination that is not, as a textual matter,
discrimination “because of the individual’s race.”
The same reasoning, broadly speaking, could have carried the day
in Bostock. There are strong arguments, paralleling those that have
rightly prevailed in the interracial relationship cases, that Title VII is
rightly understood to target employment practices that arise from and
reinforce sex-based hierarchy, in the same way that Title VII attacks
racial subordination. 249 Anti-gay and anti-transgender prejudice arise
from the same soil as does prototypical sexism and serve the same
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structures of power and privilege. That’s why Title VII plausibly
reaches sexual orientation even though discrimination on that basis is
not, textually speaking, discrimination “because of the individual’s
sex.”
CONCLUSION
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250 Michael D. Shear, Gorsuch, Conservative Favorite Appointed by Trump, Leads Way on
Landmark Decision, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/15/us
/politics/gorsuch-supreme-court-gay-transgender-rights.html [https://perma.cc/7RNK5FHZ] (“In writing the opinion, Justice Gorsuch assumed the role of his mentor, former
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, for whom he once was a clerk.”); cf. Dorf, supra note 5
(comparing and contrasting Justice Kennedy’s and Justice Gorsuch’s writing style in
landmark gay-rights decisions). But see Farias, supra note 8 (“Yet no one should rush to
christen Neil Gorsuch as Kennedy’s heir.”).
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Bostock was a banner decision for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender people. It has also been received in academic circles as
proof that textualism can lead to progressive results. We back legal
protection for sexual minorities strenuously and grant unreservedly
that bona fide application of textualism does not guarantee
conservative outcomes. But we do not think that Bostock is the right
vehicle for internalizing these lessons. Bostock’s many conservative
critics are correct: something has gone awry in Bostock, and Justice
Gorsuch’s version of textualism, when performed faithfully, doesn’t
yield Bostock’s more liberal bottom-line result.
More particularly, we have argued (a) that the ordinary meaning
of Title VII does not prohibit discrimination because of an individual’s
sexual orientation; (b) that Justice Gorsuch’s conclusion that the
specialized legal meaning of Title VII does prohibit discrimination
because of an individual’s sexual orientation rests on a misapplication
of the law’s but-for test; and (c) that correct deployment of but-for
analysis reinforces rather than destabilizes the statute’s ordinary
meaning, namely that employment discrimination on the basis of an
individual’s sexual orientation is not proscribed. If we’re right about
all this, but if you nonetheless believe (d) that this practice does violate
Title VII and therefore that Bostock reached the legally correct result,
then you have strong grounds to reject textualism as a theory of
statutory interpretation.
There is an irony to this case. Justice Gorsuch assumed Justice
Antonin Scalia’s seat, but had clerked for Justice Anthony Kennedy.
Because Kennedy, despite his broadly conservative commitments, was
a champion for gay and lesbian rights, one might consider Bostock as
evidence that Justice Gorsuch is following in his mentor’s footsteps.250
Yes and no. The difference is that Kennedy was never a singleminded textualist. His approach to law was always resolutely
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pluralist. 251 Kennedy was a good justice—flawed to be sure, but better
than he is given credit for. If Justice Gorsuch is to grow into the best
judicial version of himself, it’s not enough that he share some of his
old boss’s decency. He’ll have to wean himself from Scalia’s blinkered
approach to statutory and constitutional interpretation. He’ll have to
embrace pluralism. He’ll have to understand how Bostock could be
right despite its reasoning.
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251 Mitchell N. Berman & David Peters, Kennedy’s Legacy: A Principled Justice, 46
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 311, 340 (2019) (discussing Justice Kennedy’s principled pluralism).
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